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The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex
Procedure for a Simple Process
Donald P. Lay*
In Greek mythology, Zeus condemned Sisyphus to roll a
boulder up a hill for eternity. As Sisyphus neared the top, the
boulder always fell back, requiring him to begin his labors
anew.1 Futile labors of men are often likened to this parable.
This Article explores whether pursuit of federal habeas
corpus has turned into a Sisyphean task for both courts and liti-
gants.2 The major testing ground for this analysis is death pen-
alty litigation. My concern focuses on federal habeas corpus as
* The Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit from 1980 through 1992, Judge Lay is now the James A. Levee Profes-
sor of Criminal Procedure Law at the University of Minnesota Law School
and a senior judge on the federal court of appeals. This article is an expanded
and annotated version of the lecture Judge Lay gave on April 2, 1992 to inau-
gurate the James A. Levee Professorship. During the course of the past year,
the Eighth Circuit has reviewed several appeals in habeas corpus cases involv-
ing state prisoners. In passing upon those appeals, Judge Lay's law clerks,
Daniel Oberdorfer and Carolyn Brue, have worked with him. As a conse-
quence, they have made several contributions and provided technical assist-
ance to him in preparation of this article. Judge Lay wishes to acknowledge
his deep indebtedness to them for their assistance.
1. BULFINCH'S MYTHoLoGY 238 (Richard P. Martin ed., 1991); 24 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA AMERICANA 851 (Int'l ed. 1984).
2. At least one other circuit judge likens the current state of federal
habeas law to this parable. See Johnson v. Hargett, 978 F.2d 855, 861 (5th Cir.
1992) (Brown, J., dissenting). In Johnson, the petitioner claimed that prosecu-
tors had withheld exculpatory material during discovery. Id. at 857. The court
of appeals, however, upheld the trial judge's determination that Johnson could
not raise the violation because he had failed to include it in an earlier habeas
petition. Id. at 859. The appeals court did not consider his claim that his first
habeas lawyer provided deficient representation, violating his Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel, and asserted that Johnson had no
constitutional right to representation. Id Judge Brown, in dissent, concluded
that the case "cries out for correction." Id. at 861. He wrote:
The frustrations of Tantalus pale in comparison to the exaspera-
tion Hosey Johnson must have felt as, time and again, his Sisyphean
pleas fell on unhearing (or at least unlistening) ears, a result of the
shortcomings of those charged with seeing to it that Johnson received
fairness under our system of justice. As his odyssey through the state
and federal courts unfolds below, a picture emerges of step after inept
step, fostered by hypertechnicalities, producing a series of hollow
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it relates to divisions within the United States Supreme Court
and to the discontent of federal and state judiciaries, state de-
fender groups, state prosecutors, prisoners sitting on death row,
and perhaps most important, the American people.
Without question, something is wrong with the process.
Not only is it not improving, but if anything, dissatisfaction con-
tinues to grow, because of conflicting tensions.3 The delay in
bringing about finality of judgment (execution, in capital cases)
is a continuing problem.4 Dissatisfaction results in part because
so much controversy surrounds the death penalty and impedes
substantive resolution.
Both sides hold strong views. Thirty-six states have the
death penalty in their laws.5 Since the Court decided Furman
v. Georgia6 in 1972, 189 state prisoners have been executed.7
Courts have vacated death sentences in 1,268 cases.8 There can
be little question that if the states were to ban the death pen-
alty, a large amount of litigation would disappear. The savings
to state government would be enormous 9 -not only in sentenc-
"days in court," devoid of real substance, never considering the merits
of Johnson's facially meritorious claims.
Id.
3. AD Hoc COMM. ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMM. REPORT AND PROPOSAL 1
(1989) [hereinafter POWELL COMM. REP.]. The Supreme Court's recent deci-
sions blocking review of three death penalty cases, Herrera v. Collins, 113 S.
Ct. 853 (1993); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993), and Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993), have prompted a spate of newspaper editorials
attacking the Court's obsession with clearing its docket, especially in capital
cases. See Deadly Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1993, at A12; Death Row: Jus-
tice Takes a Back Seat to Docket Considerations, DET. FREE PRESS, Jan. 29,
1993, at 8A; Perilously Close to Murder, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Jan. 29,
1993, at 2C; see also Tom Teepen, A Death-Penalty Ruling that Puts Procedure
over Justice, STAR TRIB. (Mpls.), Feb. 3, 1993, at 15A.
4. POWELL COMM. REP., supra note 3, at 1 (noting that current system
"has led to piecemeal and repetitive litigation, and years of delay").
5. For a list of these death penalty states, see DEATH Row, U.S.A.
(NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc./Capital Punishment Project,
New York, N.Y.), Winter 1992, at 1. In addition, federal law and military stat-
utes allow capital punishment for certain crimes. Id.
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7. DEATH ROW, U.S.A., supra note 5, at 1. This statistic was current as of
January 15, 1993.
8. Id. This figure includes decisions by state courts as well as by federal
courts reviewing habeas corpus petitions. It also includes cases in which the
courts have reversed the underlying conviction. The governor of Texas has
commuted the sentence of a few additional inmates after the inmates won
favorable court decisions. In all, 58 inmates nationwide have had their capital
sentences commuted. Id.
9. The State of Florida, for example, spent at least $6 million on legal
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ing proceedings and post-conviction processes in both the state
and federal courts, but also in the guilt or innocence phase of
trials. The fact remains, however, that for various reasons, ret-
ribution undoubtedly being paramount, thirty-six states favor
the death penalty.
Regardless of rhetoric that death penalty cases should re-
ceive the same review on habeas corpus as imprisonment
cases,10 capital punishment is unique because it is irrevocable
once performed. Therefore, it is incumbent upon a civilized so-
ciety to make judicial procedures for capital punishment funda-
mentally fair, nondiscriminatory, and nonarbitrary.11 At least
since Furman, the Court has directed state legislatures to do
just that.' 2 Judicial review of death sentences must provide a
studied examination of any violations of those standards.' 3
On these principles, there should be little disagreement.
Yet, our judicial processes of review, at least in federal court,
have engendered great scrutiny and criticism both from within
the judiciary and from without.14 The chief justice of a large
proceedings in executing Ted Bundy. See Cost of Executing Bundy Was at
Least $6 Million, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Mar. 3, 1989, at 2B.
10. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 863-64 (1993) (quoting Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1989) (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) (citing Smith v.
Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538 (1986))). But see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 715-17 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting instances in which the
Court has required "stricter adherence to procedural safeguards" in capital
cases).
11. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2520 (1992); Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255-57 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
12. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2520 (describing the impact of Furman).
13. As the Eighth Circuit has noted:
The severity and finality of the death penalty requires the utmost dili-
gence and scrutiny of the court. In capital cases the law is uniquely
complex and difficult to understand. No judge can digest, retain, or
apply these principles to a voluminous state court record without re-
flective study and analysis.... As long as federal habeas review ex-
ists, it is the duty of federal judges to make certain that an individual
does not forfeit his life at the hands of the state unless the state pro-
cess lawfully rendered the punishment, it complied with federal con-
stitutional standards, and the defendant was furnished with
competent and effective representation within the norms required by
the sixth amendment. Regardless of how heinous the crime, no one
may reasonably question that a predicate to carrying out a death sen-
tence is careful review of the constitutionality of the defendant's con-
viction and sentence.
Mercer v. Armontrout, 864 F.2d 1429, 1431-32 (8th Cir. 1988).
14. See, e.g., POWELL CoMM. REP., supra note 3, at 2-3 (identifying "serious
problems" with present system); REPORT OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON DEATH
PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS (1989), reprinted in Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More
Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U.
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western state recently told me that when his state's death pen-
alty cases reach the level of federal habeas review, they disap-
pear down a "big black hole." The public's constant outcry
concerns the "endless appeals" that death row litigants may
pursue before their executions are carried out.15
In a succession of cases in recent years, the Supreme Court
has announced new rules relating to federal habeas review.
These concern successive petitions,16 abusive petitions,17 non-
retroactivity of new rules,'8 exhaustion of remedies,19 and cause
and prejudice.20 The Court has also introduced rigid definitions
of actual innocence for reviewing errors in the guilt phase of
criminal trials21 and in the sentencing phase of capital cases.
22
In doing so, the Court has perhaps consciously created pro-
cedural hurdles that make the writ less accessible to litigants,
prompting sharp dissents over the lack of fundamental fair-
ness. 23 The majority of the justices has sacrificed constitutional
fairness to reinforce its present concern over the finality of the
state judgment.2
This Article demonstrates that federal habeas review can
maintain respect for finality of state court judgments yet pro-
vide expeditious review and, most importantly, reinstate princi-
ples of fundamental fairness. To obtain these goals, however,
the procedural rules under which federal habeas review now la-
L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT]; Vivian Berger, Jus-
tice Delayed or Justice Denied? - A Comment on Recent Proposals to Reform
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1665 (1990).
15. See, e.g., Andrew H. Malcolm, The Wait on Death Row, Legal Delays
Thwart Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1990, at Al (describing capital ap-
peals process as a "legal game" designed to cause "delay, delay, delay").
16. Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (narrowing reviewability
of successive petitions to cases where petitioner "supplements his constitu-
tional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence").
17. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991) (requiring a petitioner to
demonstrate cause and prejudice when asserting claims not included in earlier
writs).
18. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) ("New constitutional rules of crim-
inal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final
before the new rules are announced.").
19. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (requiring "total exhaustion" and
dismissing habeas petition asserting both exhausted and unexhausted claims).
20. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); see also United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
21. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518-23 (1992).
22. Id. at 2523-25.
23. See, e.g., id. at 2530 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Coleman v. Thompson,
111 S. Ct. 2546, 2569 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468 (1991) (emphasizing
finality's importance to the deterrent effect of the criminal law).
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bors must be radically altered. Without change, we will con-
tinue to toil under a procedural system that breeds judicial
inefficiency, delay, public misunderstanding, and fundamental
unfairness.
I. THE WRIT'S PROCEDURAL INEFFICIENCY
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution reads: "The privi-
lege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, un-
less when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it."25
Thomas Jefferson criticized the framers of the Constitution
for not setting forth affirmative constitutional provisions on
habeas corpus.26 In Ex Parte Dorr,27 the Supreme Court held
that the federal common law writ of habeas corpus did not ex-
tend to state prisoners.2- Not until 1867, in the reconstruction
era, did Congress pass the Judiciary Act, which gave state pris-
oners, held in violation of the Federal Constitution or federal
law, the opportunity to challenge their confinement in federal
court.29  Thus, Ex Parte Dorr was overruled. In Ex Parte
Royall, the Court mandated that a state prisoner exhaust his
state court remedies,30 a requirement now codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b).
Early application of the Judiciary Act confined the federal
court's reach to questions of whether a court of competent ju-
risdiction had jurisdiction to try the prisoner.31 In Frank v.
Mangum, the Court denied a writ because the state court had
given full review, but it recognized in dicta that a federal court
could look beyond the jurisdictional question to see if the state
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
26. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS
CoRPus 133 n.52 (1980).
27. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
28. Id. at 105. In 1833, Congress provided that a judicial officer in state
custody for acts committed in furtherance of federal law could bring a petition
for habeas corpus. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634-35 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2) (1988)); see aZso In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 40-41
(1890); Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722, 724-25 (9th Cir. 1977).
29. Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (current ver-
sion at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1988)).
30. 117 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1886).
31. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (unconstitutional statute); see
aZso Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885) (finding jurisdiction lacking when
there was no grand jury indictment).
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proceeding had exceeded constitutional boundaries.3 2 Finally
in Waley v. Johnston, the Court held that a jurisdictional de-
fect was not necessary for a state prisoner to obtain federal
habeas review.33 The landmark decision of Brown v. Allen
overruled Frank and held that federal constitutional challenges
by state prisoners could be reviewed even though state courts
had reviewed the merits of a prisoner's constitutional claims.3 4
In Brown, Justice Jackson prophesied:
mhis Court has sanctioned progressive trivialization of the writ until
floods of stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions inundate the docket
of the lower courts and swell our own. Judged by our own disposition
of habeas corpus matters, they have, as a class, become peculiarly un-
deserving. It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to
be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a hay-
stack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle
is not worth the search. Nor is it any answer to say that few of these
petitions in any court really result in the discharge of the petitioner.
That is the condemnation of the procedure which has encouraged friv-
olous cases. In this multiplicity of worthless cases, states are com-
pelled to default or to defend the integrity of their judges and their
official records, sometimes concerning trials or pleas that were closed
many years ago.3
5
Despite Justice Jackson's prophecy, Justice Frankfurter's anal-
ysis carried the day in Brown. He wrote that the "[s]tate court
cannot have the last say when it, though on fair consideration
and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have mis-
conceived a federal constitutional right. '36 Justice Frankfurter
concluded that federal habeas jurisdiction "is not a case of a
lower court sitting in judgment on a higher court" but rather
"one aspect of respecting the Supremacy Clause of the Consti-
32. 237 U.S. 309, 335-36 (1915). The Frank Court stated that habeas
corpus is available when a state, "supplying no corrective process, deprives the
accused of his life or liberty without due process of law." Id.
33. 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (per curiam).
34. 344 U.S. 443, 487 (1953). In Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), the
Court, contrary to Frank, permitted federal habeas proceedings on claims of
mob domination of a trial. Moore is generally not thought to have overruled
Frank but has been viewed as a comment on the state appellate court's per-
functory review. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 457-58 (1963) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). Justice Harlan determined that Moore "is sufficiently ambiguous
that it seems to have meant all things to all men." Id. at 457. He asserted that
Brown was a clear break from prior habeas doctrine. Id. This view is widely
shared. See, e.g., ERwIN CHEMERiNSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 712 (1989).
35. Brown, 344 U.S. at 536-37 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnotes omit-
ted). Justice Jackson added: "There is no doubt that if there were a super-
Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would
also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infalli-
ble only because we are final." Id. at 540.
36. Id. at 508.
1020 [Vol. 77:1015
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tution whereby federal law is higher than State Law."37
There is no doubt, however, that Justice Jackson's predic-
tion has rung true. At the time of Brown, there were only 541
petitions filed by state prisoners.38 By 1961 there were 1,02039
and by 1970 there were 9063.40 In 1991, state prisoners filed
10,325 habeas petitions.4'
In 1982, the Attorney General introduced legislation to re-
strict the scope of federal habeas proceedings to allow only a
determination of whether the state petitioner received a full
and fair opportunity to litigate in state court.42 This legislative
measure, if passed, would have constituted a return to the law
of 1915, when the Supreme Court in Frank refused to review
the constitutionality of a mob-dominated state trial simply be-
cause the constitutional question had received full review in the
Georgia Supreme Court.43
Over the past few years, proponents of new limitations to
37. Id. at 510.
38. Id. at 536 n.8 (citing 1952 statistics for habeas corpus petitions chal-
lenging state convictions filed in federal district court).
39. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 260 n.14 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring) (citing 1972 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 11-5, 11-22, 11-28-32).
40. Id.
41. 1991 DIRECTOR OF THE ADnm. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
ANN. REP. 191.
42. The legislation would have greatly broadened the Supreme Court's
holding in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), which limited habeas review of
Fourth Amendment violations. See The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982:
Hearing on S. 2216 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9-15 (1982). After the hearings, Senator Thurmond reintroduced the pro-
posal with clarifying amendments as S. 2838, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See S.
REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1983); 128 CONG. REC. 24,430 (1982) (state-
ment of Sen. Thurmond). Similar proposals were introduced in the House, but
the House Judiciary Committee took no action. See S. REP. No. 226, supra, at
2 n.3. The following Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee held more
hearings and reported the proposal to the full Senate. See Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 829 Before the Subcomm. on Crimi-
nal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983);
S. REP. No. 226, supra, at 31 & n.118; see also 128 CONG. REC. at 24,430; Habeas
Corpus Procedures Amendments Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 653 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 21-22 (1981) (similar bill precluding federal redetermination of factual is-
sues given full and fair hearing by state courts). The Senate passed this propo-
sal in 1984, see 130 CONG. REC. 1854-72 (1984), but the House chose to take no
action on it. The proposal was revived again in the 99th Congress and,
although hearings were held, the proposal was not reported out of committee.
See Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearing on S. 238 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-9 (1985).
43. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
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habeas corpus have continued to pursue their agenda with pro-
posals to the Congress. Of particular concern to the author was
the Powell Committee, headed by former Associate Justice
Lewis F. Powell, which recommended a six-month statute of
limitations that would make habeas corpus a hollow remedy for
many state prisoners. Part II of this Article discusses the Com-
mittee's proposal in detail.
Even without congressional direction, however, the
Supreme Court has sharply restricted the scope of habeas. In
1976 in Stone v. Powell, the Supreme Court followed Justice
Powell's suggestion from Schneckloth v. Bustamonte44 and held
that prisoners are precluded from using federal habeas corpus
proceedings to assert Fourth Amendment illegal search and
seizure claims if a state court has afforded a full and fair oppor-
tunity to pursue the claim.45 The Court stated as follows:
Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to as-
sure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of lib-
erty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our system of
government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of lim-
ited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials,
(iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state sys-
tems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional balance
upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded.' 46
In a case decided as this Article went to press, the Supreme
Court declined to extend the Stone rule of preclusion to Mi-
randa-type proceedings.47 The Court had rejected applying the
Stone approach in other contexts on three prior occasions. It
declined to extend Stone to federal habeas claims alleging dis-
crimination in the selection of a grand jury,45 to habeas peti-
tions alleging a constitutional insufficiency of evidence,49 and to
habeas claims alleging violations of the Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel.5 0 This latter claim, interest-
44. 412 U.S. 218, 266 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
45. 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
46. Id. at 491 n.31 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 259 (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
47. Withrow v. Williams, No. 91-1030, 1993 WL 119753 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1993).
Writing for the majority in the 5-4 decision, Justice Souter cited the lack of
significant benefit for federal courts since "eliminating habeas review of Mi-
randa issues would not prevent a state prisoner from simply converting his
barred Miranda claim into a due process claim that his conviction rested on an
involuntary confession." Id at *8.
48. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 564 (1979).
49. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1979).
50. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1986). Justice Powelljoined the majority in Kimmelman.
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ingly, was based on counsel's failure to raise a Fourth Amend-
ment violation in state court.5 ' In each of these cases the
Supreme Court recognized the prisoner's fundamental constitu-
tional right to be protected, notwithstanding the existence of
direct review by the state courts.52
As this brief history of habeas corpus reveals, federal
habeas petitions would be drastically curtailed if the legislation
introduced in 1982 had prevailed. A return to the pre-Brown
law would eliminate the extensive analysis that lower federal
courts must go through to determine cause and prejudice, ex-
haustion of all claims, a new rule, a successive petition, an abu-
sive petition, and a miscarriage of justice under claim of actual
innocence of the conviction or of the death sentence. Such re-
form would eliminate delay and piecemeal federal appeal and
would return the finality of state court judgments to an exalted
place supreme over the Constitution.53 Expediency would no
longer be a problem for federal courts. The work load of the
federal courts would be greatly reduced.- 4 Under "full and fair
opportunity" rules, federal judges would have questionable ju-
risdiction to determine whether state authorities subjected pris-
oners to the extreme penalty of death despite violation of the
prisoner's fundamental constitutional rights. Such legislation
would give renewed emphasis to the words of Justice Stewart
in Francis v. Henderson: "This Court has long recognized that
in some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns
for the orderly administration of criminal justice require a fed-
eral court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power."55
This all sounds very logical and meritorious, but there are
51. Id at 378.
52. Id at 371, 380-81 (permitting federal habeas review even though case
had proceeded through state's appellate system); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 311 &
n.4, 323-24 (same); Rose, 443 U.S. at 549, 564 (same).
53. Such legislation would return to the state judiciary a primary role in
policing the federal courts. As Justice Kennedy recently stated in Sawyer v.
Smith: "State courts are coequal parts of our national judicial system and give
serious attention to their responsibilities for enforcing the commands of the
Constitution." 497 U.S. 227, 241 (1990).
54. The Court is concerned that duplicative litigation in federal court
"places a heavy burden on scarce judicial resources." Keeney v. Tamayo-
Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1718 (1992).
55. 425 U.S. 536, 539 (1976). By precluding federal review, it may be ar-
gued public confidence would be reinforced in attaining finality of judgment in
the state court. As Justice Powell wrote in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: "It is
this paradox of a system, which so often seems to subordinate substance to
form, that increasingly provokes criticism and lack of confidence." 412 U.S.
218, 275 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). It could also be argued the rehabilita-
1993] 1023
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many fundamental deficiencies in these arguments. They place
rules of procedural efficiency over principles of fundamental
fairness in subjecting a person's life or liberty to a possibly un-
constitutional adjudication. One is traded for the other. Speed
and finality shun the possibility of human error and injustice.56
tive interest of the criminal law will thereby be restored and no longer frus-
trated. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963).
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas,
Brown's requirement of de novo review has already been brought into ques-
tion by Teague v. Lane. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2489-91 (1992)
(plurality opinion). According to these three justices, federal habeas review is
now limited to inquiring only whether a state court was reasonable in treating
existing constitutional rules. Id. at 2490; see also Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.
407, 415 (1990) (defining a new rule for retroactive purposes as one "suscepti-
ble to debate among reasonable minds").
56. Commentators have long argued that state courts are just as effective
at applying constitutional review as federal courts. See, e.g., Michael E.
Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
213 (1982). However, there is nothing wrong with a system that stresses disci-
plined and even repetitive review of possible human errors in convicting or ex-
ecuting a person. Our sense of morality is offended if an innocent person is
convicted or if the state uses unfair, biased tactics to deprive an individual of
life or liberty without constitutional due process. A few recent habeas cases
from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals serve as good examples.
In Henderson v. Sargent, 926 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 915 (1992), the defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death. The court of appeals affirmed the grant of writ of habeas corpus on the
ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Counsel had failed to investi-
gate the crime and discover factual circumstances that incriminated the vic-
tim's husband and two other persons. The only evidence incriminating
Henderson was a sheet of yellow paper belonging to him that was found on
the floor of the victim's place of work. The defendant testified and gave an
alibi that was corroborated by his wife. Although not discoverable by trial
counsel, the victim's husband told a third person at the coroner's hearing that
he disputed the coroner's opinion that the victim had been sitting when she
was shot. The husband said, "[That's not the way it was. She dove out of the
chair to miss the bullet." Id. at 711 n.8.
In a second habeas case, Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1991),
the petitioner received a 242-year sentence for threatening the payroll depart-
ment of his company with a gun while distraught. The petitioner had had his
billfold stolen from his truck. He was without funds and requested the payroll
department to advance his check by one day so he would have money. It re-
fused to do so. Smith returned with a loaded pistol and threatened the seven
employees. He was convicted of extortion with an armed weapon and was
given 242 years. A state justice dissented on direct appeal and stated he found
the sentence "outrageous" and "unconscionable." See id. at 1316 n.1. On ap-
peal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus to the Eighth Circuit, we ob-
served: "Although this sentence might be legalistically condoned, it should
shock the inner conscience of reasonable minds that our laws allow such treat-
ment." Id. The Eighth Circuit granted a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding. Id. at
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As Herbert Packer teaches us, quality control is missing from
the assembly line production of criminal conviction.57 Argu-
ments of state court finality and comity lose sight of the histori-
cal concerns of our constitutional fathers. In 1821, Chief
Justice Marshall observed the Constitution did not provide the
states with preeminent authority for enforcing the Constitu-
tion.58 He wrote:
There is certainly nothing in the circumstances under which our con-
stitution was formed; nothing in the history of the times, which would
justify the opinion that the confidence reposed in the States was so
implicit, as to leave in them and their tribunals the power of resisting
or undefeating, in the form of law, the legitimate measures of the
Union.5
9
Over a century later, Justice Rutledge stated:
The writ should be available whenever there clearly has been a fun-
damental miscarriage of justice for which no other adequate remedy
is presently available. Beside executing its great object, which is the
preservation of personal liberty and assurance against its wrongful
deprivation, considerations of economy of judicial time and proce-
dures, important as they undoubtedly are, become comparatively
insignificant. 6 0
A majority of the Supreme Court later observed that the "pre-
vention of undue restraints on liberty is more important than
mechanical and unrealistic administration of the federal
courts.'
1321-22. Smith's appointed counsel was a part-time municipal judge whom
Smith was suing in a § 1983 case.
In another state prisoner case, Jones v. Arkansas, the Eighth Circuit re-
versed a trial court and granted a writ of habeas corpus because the defendant
had been sentenced under a state statute that was not in force at the time of
his crime. 929 F.2d 375, 381 (8th Cir. 1991). We stated:
It would be difficult to think of one who is more "innocent" of a sen-
tence than a defendant sentenced under a statute that by its very
terms does not even apply to the defendant.
Jones' case falls within the extremely narrow band of cases in
which a federal habeas court can grant the writ based on a miscar-
riage of justice. As Justice Frankfurter wrote almost half a century
ago, "[t]he history of liberty has largely been the history of obser-
vance of procedural safeguards."
Id. (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943)).
57. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 9-23 (1964).
58. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387-428 (1821).
59. Id. at 388. In Kaufman v. United States, the Court said "[t]he right...
is not merely to a federal forum but to full and fair consideration of constitu-
tional claims." 394 U.S. 217, 228 (1969).
60. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 189 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
61. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 681 (1948). The Supreme Court recog-
nized the great weight to be accorded life and liberty when it stated in Sanders
v. United States that "[c]onventional notions of finality of litigation have no
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A basic deficiency in the rationale of returning to the pre-
Brown era is the failure to realize that at that time the
Supreme Court had not interpreted the Bill of Rights as apply-
ing to the states.62 At that time, therefore, the Court simply
focused on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which did little more than guarantee a full and fair hear-
ing in the state court.63 When the Court applied the Bill of
Rights, particularly the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,
to the states, the reasoning changed. Thus, as Justice O'Connor
makes clear in her concurrence in Wright v. West, the pre-
Brown limitations were "a rule of constitutional law, not a
threshold requirement of habeas corpus."
In 1991, after the Senate moved to narrow habeas corpus
dramatically, Justice Brennan wrote to Congressman Jack
Brooks, pointing out the shortcomings of legislation to remove
de novo federal review in habeas corpus. Justice Brennan
wrote:
The Great Writ of habeas corpus is the principal means by which
federal courts can protect the Bill of Rights in state criminal cases.
The crime bill recently passed by the Senate, however, contains pro-
posals that would effectively strip federal courts of their habeas
corpus jurisdiction.
According to that bill, when state courts "fully and fairly adjudi-
cate" a federal constitutional claim, federal courts are barred from re-
place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights
is alleged." 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963). In Mackey v. United States, Justice Harlan
summarized the underlying rationale of habeas corpus as providing "a quasi-
appellate review function, forcing trial and appellate courts in both the federal
and state system to toe the constitutional mark." 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971)
(opinion of Harlan, J.). Justice Harlan has echoed the sentiments of those
who advocate a decisive conclusion to drawn out litigation. He acknowledged
that the interests of concluding litigation may well outweigh the competing in-
terest in readjudicating convictions, but he was also convinced that "[t]he con-
sequences of injustice-loss of liberty and sometimes loss of life-are far too
great to permit the automatic application of an entire body of technical rules
whose primary relevance lies in the area of civil litigation." Sanders, 373 U.S.
at 24 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan criticized the idea of an arbitrary
cut-off point for habeas petitions, stating "[tihere is little societal interest in
permitting the criminal process to rest at a point where it ought properly
never to repose." Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693.
62. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2493 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
63. Id.; see also Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260 (1922) (stating that
the Constitution requires only that a defendant receive a full and fair trial in
state court); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (denying habeas corpus be-
cause the state prisoner had already received a full and fair hearing in the
state court).
64. 112 S. Ct. at 2493.
1026 [Vol. 77:1015
HABEAS CORPUS
viewing the claim. "Full and fair adjudication" is a legal term of art,
both in habeas corpus and other contexts. Under the "full and fair
adjudication" standard, the state courts need only hold a procedurally
regular hearing; even cases in which the state court has overlooked
serious constitutional violations would be immune from federal
courts' review. This prospect is particularly troubling in state capital
cases: an American Bar Association study reveals that in forty per-
cent of such cases, habeas courts have, until now, granted relief. For
these reasons, I must agree with the recent decision by the Judicial
Conference of the United States to "oppose the inclusion of language
relating to full and fair adjudication."
The Senate crime bill is of course intended to reduce unnecessary
delays in carrying out valid sentences. The bill, however, addresses
these delays simply by making relief for constitutional violations im-
possible. It is unwise, I think, to purchase greater speed in criminal
proceedings at the price of our constitutional liberties. Moreover, the
Senate bill fails to address one important cause of delay in state crimi-
nal, particularly capital, proceedings-the inadequacy of trial counsel
who in many cases fail to identify and raise constitutional issues in
timely fashion. I note in this connection the recommendation of the
American Bar Association and the Judicial Conference of the United
States that a mandatory system of specific attorney competency stan-
dards be established in every state that imposes the death penalty.
This is a complex issue, not easily understood. I hope you will
take the time to study it carefully because it is vital to this country's
constitutional protections and longstanding legal traditions.65
In approaching the question of legislative change, we
should never lose sight of Justice Frankfurter's admonition in
Brown v. Allen: "The complexities of our federalism and the
workings of a scheme of government involving the interplay of
two governments, one of which is subject to limitations enforce-
able by the other, are not to be escaped by simple, rigid rules
which, by avoiding some abuses, generate others."66
B. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES
By passing the Habeas Corpus Act in 1867, Congress im-
plicitly recognized that state courts did not always view state
convictions with the Federal Constitution in mind.6 7 However,
it was a fundamental premise of federalism that state courts be
given every opportunity to manage their own criminal dockets
65. Letter from William Brennan, Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, to Congressman Jack Brooks, Chair of the House Judiciary
Committee (Oct. 8, 1991) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
66. 344 U.S. 443, 498 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
67. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 248 (1886) (stating that "it was the pur-
pose of Congress to invest the courts of the Union... to restore to liberty any




before federal review. This premise led the Supreme Court in
1886 to require that state prisoners exhaust state court proce-
dures before they could receive benefits from federal habeas
relief.68
The various states expanded their own procedures for col-
lateral review after the Supreme Court, in Fay v. Noia,6 9 eased
federal habeas requirements for constitutional claims that peti-
tioners had not pursued in state court.70 The integrity of state
finality was thus vindicated by the state courts' competence in
handling their own criminal docket and "toe[ing] the constitu-
tional mark."71 Federal review was still justified because of the
need to provide uniformity in federal constitutional law, thus
adhering to Supremacy Clause doctrine.72 As early observed by
Chief Justice Marshall: if state courts were given final jurisdic-
tion over federal causes, the result would be "a hydra in gov-
ernment from which nothing but contradiction and confusion
can proceed."7 3
The great proliferation of cases collaterally challenging
state court convictions has caused the states to look for ways to
limit their collateral procedures. 74 Many states have now lim-
ited or eliminated state post-conviction review by enacting pro-
cedural bypass rules.75 By refusing to provide post-conviction
68. Id. at 252-53; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988) (requiring exhaustion of
state remedies); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same); Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982) (explaining policies underlying exhaustion
doctrine).
69. 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977), and Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991), and Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992), and Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514
(1992). Fay allowed prisoners to present claims to the federal habeas court
that the prisoners had not raised in the state court as long as the prisoner had
not deliberately bypassed the state procedures. Id. at 438.
70. The federal courts rarely have found these constitutional claims to be
valid. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
71. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971) (opinion of
Harlan, J.). I recall Justice Brennan addressing a bar group in Missouri, in
1965, before I was a federal judge, encouraging each state to establish and ex-
pand their post-conviction procedures so as initially to examine the constitu-
tional fairness of state convictions.
72. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 510 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter,
J.).
73. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 415-16 (1821) (citation
omitted).
74. See, e.g., Whitmore v. State, 771 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Ark. 1989) (stating
that post-conviction remedies are "out of control").
75. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28 (1982) (discussing Ohio
rules); Dawan v. Lockhart, 980 F.2d 470, 475 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that in
abolishing certain post-conviction rules, the Arkansas Supreme Court has lim-
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review, states left prisoners no opportunity to exhaust state
remedies before federal habeas review.76 These short-sighted
reforms meant that the states failed to heed their own com-
plaints that federal intrusion eliminated the state courts' oppor-
tunity to provide constitutional integrity to their own
judgments. Thus, the states themselves abdicated responsibil-
ity, turning their backs on the deference and comity that the
federal courts attempted to provide state decisional processes.
With state exhaustion futile,77 states placed a greater burden on
the limited resources of the federal judiciary. Federal district
court often became the initial forum for evidentiary hearing
and decision making.78 In addition, federal courts had to as-
sume sole responsibility for post-conviction constitutional adju-
dication of state prisoner claims.79
In Rose v. Lundy, 0 the Supreme Court made a rudimen-
tary change to the requirements of exhausting state remedies.
This change has added to the burden that federal habeas courts
shoulder. In order to obviate piecemeal review through the fil-
ing of repetitive petitions for different claims, the Supreme
Court ruled in Rose that before any exhausted constitutional
claims could be reviewed, the complaint must not contain any
unexhausted claims.81 If the petition contained unexhausted
claims, the entire petition had to be denied and remanded to
the state court for full exhaustion. Prior to Rose, the federal
courts had not required total exhaustion before entertaining a
ited state habeas relief to cases where "the commitment is invalid on its face
or the committing court lacked jurisdiction" (quoting Mackey v. Lockhart, 819
S.W.2d 702, 704 (Ark. 1991))). Arkansas has since reinstated some post-convic-
tion remedies. See ARK. R. CIM. P. 37.1 publisher's notes. Missouri has also
limited state post-conviction relief. For example, Missouri imposes sharp limi-
tations on the number of days a prisoner has to file for post-conviction relief,
Mo. R. CRIM. P. 29.15(b) (30 days after the filing of a transcript if an appeal is
taken), and consolidates the post-conviction proceedings with direct appeals,
id. at 29.15(1). Missouri also provides for state habeas corpus proceedings, Mo.
R. Civ. P. 91, but the state courts have not determined how the post-conviction
and habeas procedures interrelate. Schlup v. Armontrout, 941 F.2d 631, 637
(8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1273 (1992).
76. See, e.g., Engle, 456 U.S. at 125-26 n.28; Dawan, 980 F.2d at 475.
77. See, e.g., Engle, 456 U.S. at 125-26 n.28.
78. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988), federal courts must give deference to
state court findings of fact. Without evidentiary records from the state court,
however, federal courts become the first court to hear factual claims and to
have available the state court factual determinations.
79. See, e.g., Engle, 456 U.S. at 125 n.28.
80. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).




Rather than reducing piecemeal review, Rose v. Lundy has
created bifurcated review in both state and federal courts.8 3
Under this process, federal district courts first review habeas
petitions to ascertain whether the prisoner has exhausted all
state claims. Often, this determination is not made until the
case is reviewed on appeal. Whether or not the exhausted fed-
eral claims are meritorious, they cannot be adjudicated until
the prisoner returns to state court to exhaust all unexhausted
claims.8 4 After so doing, the petitioner can return to federal
court. This process results in the addition of interminable de-
lays in adjudicating the claims and the waste of both state and
federal resources. Moreover, it confuses and frustrates unedu-
cated prisoners and prison writ writers.8 5 Finally, there is no
evidence that the rule achieved its goal of reducing piecemeal
petitions. In fact, the experience is just the opposite.86
82. Id. at 523 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
83. Justice Blackmun was concerned that Rose would promote delay of
non-frivolous claims rather than speed the process. Id. at 522, 527-29 (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 522.
85. Id. at 522 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that the decision "oper-
ates as a trap for the uneducated and indigent pro se prisoner-applicant").
86. The excessive delay caused by the exhaustion and procedural bypass
rules is well illustrated by the history of LaRette v. Delo, now pending in the
federal court in the Eastern District of Missouri. No. 86-0753 C(2) (E.D. Mo.
filed Apr. 11, 1986). Acting pro se, Anthony J. LaRette, a death-row inmate at
the Potosi Correctional Center, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court on April 11, 1986. Petition for Rehearing and
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 1, In re Delo, No. 92-3468 (8th Cir. Dec.
11, 1992).
A state court jury had convicted LaRette of capital murder and the Mis-
souri Supreme Court, on March 29, 1983, upheld his conviction and sentence.
State v. LaRette, 648 S.W.2d 96 (Mo.) (en banc), cert denied, 464 U.S. 908
(1983). LaRette's attempts at state post-conviction relief were denied. See
LaRette v. State, 757 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); LaRette v. State, 703
S.W.2d 37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
The federal habeas court entered an order staying LaRette's execution on
April 11, 1986. Petition at 1, Delo (No. 92-3468). The Missouri Attorney Gen-
eral argued that the habeas petition contained unexhausted claims and the dis-
trict court appointed the Federal Public Defender's Office to represent
LaRette. Id. LaRette filed amended petitions on July 17, 1986 and August 20,
1986. Id. In June 1988, pursuant to an amended response, the district court
accepted the Attorney General's waiver of the exhaustion defense. Id. On
February 3, 1989, LaRette filed his third amended petition. Id. The Attorney
General responded April 10, 1989, raising the "defense of procedural bar de-
spite the recent 'waiver of exhaustion.'" Id. LaRette then filed a "motion to
hold the proceedings in abeyance" while he exhausted his claims in state
court. The motion was granted November 14, 1990. Id.




In Wainwright v. Sykes,8 7 the Court rejected the deliberate
bypass rule of Fay v. Noia, which had allowed prisoners to
present issues on federal habeas that they did not present at
their trial unless they had deliberately chosen to bypass state
adjudication. Instead, the Court adopted a rule requiring pris-
oners to show "cause and prejudice" for defaulting on issues at
their state trials.88 Under this standard, a petitioner must show
cause for the noncompliance and actual prejudice from the al-
leged constitutional violation.8 9
The Court proffered four reasons for adopting the cause
on February 14, 1992. Id. One month later, the district court referred some
issues to a magistrate judge and excluded other claims from consideration. Id.
at 1-2. LaRette moved for reconsideration, and the district court ordered him
to show cause why the excluded claims should be considered. Id. at 2.
LaRette filed his pleadings on August 5, 1992, and five days later, the Attorney
General filed his opposition. Id. Ten days later, on August 20, 1992, LaRette
filed his reply. Id. The magistrate judge on August 28, 1992, directed LaRette
to show he had exhausted the excluded claims. Id. On September 7, 1992,
LaRette filed a request for clarification and subsequently filed a timely re-
sponse to the magistrate's order. Id.
The Attorney General then filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals even though he had not sought relief from
the district court. Id. On December 11, 1992, a panel of the Eighth Circuit
issued a writ of mandamus ordering the district court judge "to consider all of
the issues presented in LaRette's case and to enter final judgment within 150
days of the date of th[e] order." In re Delo, No. 92-3468, slip op. at 1 (8th Cir.
Dec. 11, 1992) (emphasis added). As of January 1993, the case was still pend-
ing in the district court.
The unbelievable history of delay in the above case can be directly traced
to the decisions of Rose v. Lundy, discussed in this section, and Wainwright v.
Sykes, discussed in the next section. This case history is not atypical of hun-
dreds of other cases reported in the courts of appeals.
The merits of this case could have been adjudicated in 1986 without delay.
Notwithstanding the nonexhausted claims, the case would have resulted in a
final adjudication within a reasonable time.
87. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Wainwright grew out of the Court's decisions in
Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), and Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.
536 (1976). The Court has debated whether the procedural bypass rules are
founded on the concept of adequate state grounds, Coleman v. Thompson, 111
S. Ct. 2546, 2553-54 (1991), or whether they rest on principles of federalism,
Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 280 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan challenged the legal underpinnings the majority advanced in Sykes,
stating that "the entire edifice is a mere house of cards whose foundation has
escaped any systematic inspection." 433 U.S. at 100 n.1 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
88. 433 U.S. at 88-91. The Court drove the final coffin spike into Fay by
limiting the miscarriage of justice exception last Term in Sawyer v. Whitley,
112 S. Ct. 2514, 2618-23 (1992).
89. 433 U.S. at 84, 90-91.
10311993]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
and prejudice standard. First, it stated that a contemporaneous
objection clarifies the record when recollections of witnesses
are fresh.90 Second, precluding federal review lends to finality
in criminal litigation.91 Third, stricter procedural bypass rules
avoid "sandbagging" on the part of defense lawyers "who may
take their chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial
court with the intent to raise their constitutional claims in a
federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off."92
Fourth, the Court opined that federal habeas review detracts
from the state trial as a "decisive and portentous event." 93
Wainwright and its progeny of United States v. Frady,94
Engle v. Isaac,95 and Murray v. Carrier,96 turn on principles of
comity and federalism. As Justice O'Connor said in Engle:
[Tihe Great Writ imposes special costs on our federal system. The
States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the crimi-
nal law. In criminal trials they also hold the initial responsibility for
vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state crimi-
nal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offend-
ers and their good faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.
97
The Court has viewed the tension between habeas review and
90. Id. at 88.
91. Id. at 88-89.
92. Id. at 89. With all due respect, the sandbagging argument is superfi-
cial. As Justice Brennan observed, "no rational lawyer would risk the
'sandbagging' feared by the Court." Id. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Under the Fay procedural bypass standard, an attorney who elects to sandbag
must:
First, hold back the presentation of his constitutional claim to the
trial court, thereby increasing the likelihood of a conviction since the
prosecution would be able to present evidence that, while arguably
constitutionally deficient, may be highly prejudicial to the defense.
Second, he would thereby have forfeited all state review and remedies
with respect to these claims (subject to whatever "plain error" rule is
available). Third, to carry out his scheme, he would now be com-
pelled to deceive the federal habeas court and to convince the judge
that he did not "deliberately bypass" the state procedures. If he loses
on this gamble, all federal review would be barred, and his "sandbag-
ging" would have resulted in nothing but the forfeiture of all judicial
review of his client's claims. The Court, without substantiation, ap-
parently believes that a meaningful number of lawyers are induced
into [this option] by Fay. I do not. That belief simply offends com-
mon sense.
I& at 103-04 n.5.
93. Id. at 90.
94. 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (defining prejudice).
95. 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (discussing standards for cause).
96. 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (discussing standards for cause).
97. 456 U.S. at 128 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 263-65
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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finality in terms of a cost-benefit analysis,98 recently emphasiz-
ing the need to respect state procedural rules.99 The majority
in Coleman v. Thompson urged that the decision in Fay "under-
valued the importance of state procedural rules."'1  Thus, the
Court has returned state interests to a dominant position, as
was the case before Brown.'10
The cause and prejudice rule has created serious problems.
As Justice Brennan observed in his dissent in Wainwright, pro-
cedural default arises mostly because counsel inadvertently
failed to follow procedural rules. L0 2 Any realistic system of fed-
eral habeas corpus jurisdiction must be premised on the reality
that the ordinary procedural default is born of the inadver-
tence, negligence, inexperience, or incompetence of trial coun-
sel.10 3  If the world were perfect-if appointed trial counsel
were all trained, proficient criminal trial counsel-the rule of
98. For example, the Court in Coleman v. Thompson stated that a "differ-
ent allocation of costs is appropriate in those circumstances where the State
has no responsibility to ensure that the petitioner was represented by compe-
tent counsel. As between the State and the petitioner, it is the petitioner who
must bear the burden of failure to follow state procedural rules." 111 S. Ct.
2546, 2567 (1991); see also Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992) (stat-
ing that denial of habeas corpus was based on the costs of federal habeas re-
view); McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991) (discussing the costs of federal
habeas review, including the loss of finality of judgment); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 310 (1988) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (suggesting that costs to the
states outweigh the benefits of retroactive application of new constitutional
rules in habeas corpus). The dissent in Coleman attacks the balance struck by
the majority, stating:
In a sleight of logic that would be ironic if not for its tragic conse-
quences, the majority concludes that a state prisoner pursuing state
collateral relief must bear the risk of his attorney's grave errors-
even if the result of those errors is that the prisoner will be executed
without having presented his federal claim to a federal court-be-
cause this attribution of risk represents the appropriate "allocation of
costs."
111 S. Ct. at 2576 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
99. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2551 (noting "the important interest in finality
served by state procedural rules, and the significant harm to the States that
results from the failure of federal courts to respect" federal-state relations);
see also McC7eskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1468 ("Since Fay we have taken care in our
habeas corpus decisions to reconfirm the importance of finality.").
100. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2565.
101. The Court has provided two exceptions to this pre-Brown rationaliza-
tion: when the prisoner can demonstrate cause for default and actual preju-
dice from the violation of federal constitutional law, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 84, 90-91 (1977), and when the prisoner can demonstrate a fundamen-
tal miscarriage of justice, Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. at 2518-19.




cause and prejudice would not be as unjust as it now is. Even
in death row cases, however, appointed counsel are all too fre-
quently ill-trained for the assignment.'1 4 It seems incongruous
that the state or federal court that appoints and pays counsel
for the indigent may deny the petitioner review of a valid fed-
eral constitutional claim based upon the procedural oversight of
that same appointed counsel.10 5
Three landmark cases illustrate the problem. In Engle v.
Isaac,10 6 counsel for three defendants failed to object at sepa-
rate trials to jury instructions that placed the burden of proof
on the defense.10 7 This burden impaired the fact-finding func-
tion of the trials themselves. The lawyers did not object pri-
marily because Ohio law, at the time of trial, placed the burden
on the defense, and counsel believed any objection would be fu-
tile.108 The Supreme Court majority reasoned that because of
other decisions percolating through the courts, counsel did not
lack "the tools" to make an objection.10 9 In his dissent, Justice
Brennan responded that the holding makes it easier to take "a
camel.., through the eye of a needle than for a state prisoner
to show 'cause.' "110
The second case, Murray v. Carrier,"' involved a defense
counsel's failure to raise in state appeal the trial judge's denial
of a discovery request for exculpatory evidence under Brady v.
104. See Chief Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Statement to the Judicial
Conference of the United States 8-9 (Mar. 13, 1990) (transcript on file with the
Minnesota Law Review). Judge Higginbotham cites several shocking cases of
inappropriate representation from appointed counsel, including one case in
which the lawyer described his own client as a "nigger" in front of the jury.
Id. at 9. For further discussion of this problem, see infra notes 236-39 and ac-
companying text.
105. Cf. Wainwrigh; 433 U.S. at 114 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that
of the parties, the state sets forth admission and certification policies for
attorneys).
106. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
107. Id. at 110-14.
108. Id. at 130.
109. Id. at 132-33.
110. Id. at 144. Justice Brennan observed that Isaac's claims had not been
exhausted and then added:
Barely a month ago this Court emphatically reaffirmed the exhaus-
tion doctrine, and indeed extended it, announcing a requirement of
"total exhaustion" for habeas petitions. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509
(March 3, 1982). But today the Court finds the nostrum of "cause and
prejudice" more attractive, and so Rose v. Lundy is not applied. Sic
transit gloria Lundy! In scarcely a month, the bloom is off the Rose.
Id. at 141 (footnotes omitted).
111. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
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MarYland.112 The Carrier Court held that misjudgment or
oversight of counsel on appeal did not overcome the fear of
"sandbagging. 11 3  It concluded that "[f]ailure to raise a claim
on appeal reduces the finality of appellate proceedings, deprives
the appellate court of an opportunity to review trial error, and
'undercut[s] the State's ability to enforce its procedural
rules.' "1114
Finally, in Coleman v. Thompson,115 a capital case that re-
ceived nationwide publicity, 1 6 the Court barred federal review
because post-conviction counsel was three days late filing an ap-
peal of an ineffective trial counsel claim in a state post-convic-
tion petition.1 7 The Supreme Court held that even the
incompetence of post-conviction counsel could not constitute
cause. It relied in part on two civil cases to hold that
"[a]ttorney ignorance or inadvertence is not 'cause' because the
attorney is the petitioner's agent when acting, or failing to act,
in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must 'bear
the risk of attorney error.' "118 Because there is no constitu-
tional right to an attorney in a post-conviction proceeding, a pe-
titioner cannot claim constitutional ineffective assistance of
counsel in such proceedings." 9 The Court rejected the argu-
ment that a prisoner should be able to satisfy the "cause" re-
quirement by showing the ineffectiveness of counsel, even
absent a constitutional right to counsel at that stage of the pro-
ceedings.1 20 Thus, the Court made clear "that counsel's ineffec-
112. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
113. 477 U.S. at 491-92.
114. Id. at 491 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982)).
115. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
116. See, e.g., Robert L. Jackson & David G. Savage, Final Appeals Re-
jected, Killer is Executed, L.A. TmEs, May 21, 1992, at A16.
117. 111 S. Ct. at 2552-53, 2567-68.
118. Id. at 2566-67 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).
The two civil cases the Court cites are Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 634
(1962), and Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453, 456 (1990) (stating that
"in 'our system of representative litigation ... each party is deemed bound by
the acts of his lawyer-agent' "). The Court added that "it is not the gravity of
the attorney's error that matters, but that it constitutes a violation of peti-
tioner's right to counsel, so that the error must be seen as an external factor,
i.e. 'imputed to the State.'" 111 S. Ct. at 2567 (quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469
U.S. 387, 396 (1985)).
119. See 111 S. Ct. at 2552-53.
120. The Court stated that "the existence of cause for a procedural default
must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective
factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the
State's procedural rule." For example, "a showing that the factual or legal ba-
sis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel .... or that 'some inter-
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tiveness will constitute cause only if it is an independent
constitutional violation.'12 1
It is difficult to understand why cause must be so rigidly
defined. Post-conviction counsel's error is not the petitioner's
fault. Cause and prejudice is strictly a court-made rule to give
sufficient credence to comity and to defer to a state's need to
enforce its procedural rules.122 Coleman bars federal habeas re-
view if the petitioner's post-conviction lawyer failed to file a
timely appeal to the state post-conviction court. If counsel
failed to adhere to state appellate procedures on direct review,
however, his or her conduct would fall within the purview of
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of coun-
sel.123 This is true even though the lawyer was the agent for
his client. 24 Although the Sixth Amendment does not apply to
post-conviction proceedings, the error is the same in both types
of proceedings. Under either circumstance, the conduct of
counsel would fall below the standard of reasonable profes-
sional performance and there exists no logical reason why such
omission should not be considered cause to obviate the proce-
dural default.us
The Court has often written that there are "costs" to
habeas proceedings that require procedural rules precluding
federal habeas in favor of state finality, 2 6 but the Court's ap-
proach has several hidden costs itself. The cause and prejudice
ference by officials' . . . made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause
under this standard." 111 S. Ct. at 2566 (citations omitted) (quoting Carrier,
477 U.S. at 488).
121. Id. at 2567. The Court said any argument to the contrary contradicts
its holding in Murray v. Carrier. 111 S. Ct. at 2566.
122. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992) (noting that
the cause and prejudice standard is "premised on our concerns for the finality
of state judgments of conviction and the 'significant costs of federal habeas re-
view' "); Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. at 2571 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(criticizing "the majority's unjustifiable elevation of abstract federalism over
fundamental precepts of liberty and fairness"); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 501 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (stating that the "formula... is not dispositive when the
fundamental fairness of a prisoner's conviction is at issue"); Engle v. Isaac, 456
U.S. 107, 148 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's "hostility"
to habeas corpus claims "through its application of the cause and prejudice
standard").
123. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Hannon v. Maschner, 845
F.2d 1553 (10th Cir. 1988).
124. See Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2566-67.
125. See, e.g., Simmons v. Lockhart, 915 F.2d 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1990) (opin-
ion of Arnold, J.) (stating that "ineffective assistance of post-conviction coun-
sel can be 'cause' for purposes of lifting a procedural bar").
126. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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test does not accomplish its intended goals. First, it is very
time consuming.'2 The federal district courts must undertake
lengthy and excessive analyses to determine first, whether
there was a procedural bypass; second, whether there was
cause; third, whether there was prejudice; and fourth, whether
either the conviction or the death penalty represents a miscar-
riage of justice. Second, this exacting analysis creates inevita-
ble delay at each level of the federal system-magistrate,
district court, appellate court, and Supreme Court. 28 Undoubt-
edly, the Court feels these factors do not override the demands
of federalism. However, I find this balance especially difficult
127. There are numerous cases in every circuit illustrating the excessive
examination that cause and prejudice rules require even though examination
of the merits of the constitutional claim could be resolved under settled princi-
ples within a much shorter time. See, e.g., Stokes v. Armontrout, 901 F.2d
1460, 1463 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Lay, C.J., dissenting) (noting the "proce-
dural catch-22" that prevented Stokes's claims from being heard on their
merits).
128. A good case in point is Rust v. Hopkins, 984 F.2d 1486 (8th Cir. 1993),
in which the Eighth Circuit recently upheld a writ of habeas corpus because of
constitutional violations in the death sentence phase of Rust's trial. In af-
firming the trial judge, the court expressed its concern over the more than 17
years the case had been pending in the courts without final resolution. Id. at
1489 n.5. Rust first petitioned for federal habeas relief in 1981, see Rust v. Par-
ratt, No. CV 81-L-332, slip op. at 1 (D. Neb. Nov. 10, 1982), but the case was not
resolved until the Eighth Circuit's January 20, 1993 opinion. As is shown in
the following chronology, procedural issues accounted for most of the delay:
Rust was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in the Nebraska
state courts in 1975. 984 F.2d at 1489 n.5. His conviction and sentence were
upheld on direct appeal, State v. Rust, 250 N.W.2d 867 (Neb.), cert denied, 434
U.S. 912 (1977), and on petition for post-conviction relief in the state courts,
State v. Rust, 303 N.W.2d 490 (Neb.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981). Rust
then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the federal courts, but at Rust's sug-
gestion the trial judge dismissed the action for lack of exhaustion. Rust v.
Parratt, slip op. at 1. Rust returned to state court, where he again lost. State
v. Rust, 388 N.W.2d 483 (Neb. 1986) (per curiam), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1042
(1987). The state courts also denied Rust's petition for state habeas corpus in
1988. Rust v. Gunter, 421 N.W.2d 458 (Neb. 1988). Thus, as the Eighth Circuit
noted, "twelve years and eight months elapsed between the trial and the state
court's final denial of relief." 984 F.2d at 1489 n.5.
Rust returned to the federal courts with his second petition for habeas
corpus relief in 1988. Id. The district court granted Rust relief, requiring Ne-
braska either to resentence Rust or to impose no more than a life term of im-
prisonment, but the Eighth Circuit remanded the case because the district
court had not disposed of all issues. Rust v. Clarke, 960 F.2d 72, 73-74 (8th Cir.
1992) (per curiam). The appeals court directed the trial judge to resolve those
issues within 90 days. Id. at 73. More than 11 years after Rust filed his first
habeas petition, both the district and circuit court, after an exhaustive analysis
that included claims of procedural default, denied the grant of the writ on the
merits of the conviction. However, the Eighth Circuit did affirm the trial
court's grant of the writ as to the penalty phase of the case. 984 F.2d at 1495.
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to reconcile in light of the more important trade-off--denying
prisoners a review of convictions or death sentences that states
may have imposed in violation of federal constitutional
fairness.129
It is not the author's purpose to debate the "cause and prej-
udice" and "deliberate bypass" rules. Whether a lower court
judge agrees or disagrees with a legal standard is irrelevant.
The author's purpose is to demonstrate the efficacy of the rule
of cause and prejudice in terms of whether it carries out the
purposes it is designed to serve. Such an analysis must start
with an examination of the fundamental purpose behind habeas
corpus legislation and the scope of the writ itself.
The cause and prejudice standard conflicts with the very
purpose of federal habeas corpus. As a court-made rule, the
cause and prejudice requirement is designed to artificially pro-
vide great deference to state trial and appellate proceedings,
thus lending greater integrity to the finality of state court judg-
ments. Of course, the pre-Brown rule precluding de novo fed-
eral review accomplished this goal also. Indeed, the two
procedures differ only minimally in promoting comity and def-
erence to state tribunals. But the Court in Brown v. Allen re-
jected blind adherence to comity and deference for good reason.
The rationale of Brown rests on the idea that the very nature
of the writ of habeas corpus is to attack faulty state court final-
ity.1 30 Any rule that protects an unconstitutional state court
judgment is hardly worth promoting. Federal habeas corpus
was not designed to give deference and comity to state finality
rules, but to serve as a vehicle for attacking state convictions
that rest upon unconstitutional process.1 31
129. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2530 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("The writ [of habeas corpus] is a bulwark against convictions that
violate 'fundamental fairness'.").
130. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498-501 (1953) (opinion of Frank-
furter, J.) (discussing Congress's grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction to the fed-
eral judiciary).
131. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Coleman sums up this notion:
While state courts may choose to draw their orders as they wish, the
right of a state prisoner, particularly one sentenced to death, to have
his federal claim heard by a federal habeas court is simply too funda-
mental to yield to the State's incidental interest in issuing ambiguous
summary orders.
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2574 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun concludes:
To permit a procedural default caused by attorney error egregious
enough to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel to preclude fed-
eral habeas review of a state prisoner's federal claims in no way
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The principles of federalism can be maintained without the
lower federal courts' excessive preoccupation with procedural
rules and the inevitable delay that all the procedural obstacles
cause.132 Justice Stevens's dissent in Rose v. Lundy contains
the seeds of a workable system of merit review for federal
habeas cases.133 It would eliminate the artificial rules that now
preoccupy the federal judiciary and provide simplicity and effi-
ciency to federal habeas process. I think it is a fair conclusion
that his view will, someday, prevail.
In his Rose v. Lundy dissent, Justice Stevens pointed out
three classifications of constitutional claims that federal courts
could routinely handle and easily adjudicate without excessive
examination: first, those claims that factually do not amount to
a violation of a constitutional right, even though labeled as
such;134 second, those cases involving a violation of a constitu-
tional right that constituted harmless error on direct review;13 5
and third, those cases that might constitute error on direct re-
view but that do not contain the kind of fundamental unfair-
ness that supports a collateral attack. 38
A fourth class is comprised of cases that may require issu-
ance of a writ. These are cases in which the violation may af-
fect the validity of the underlying judgment or the integrity of
the state process by which the judgment was obtained. Only in
such rare instances should federal habeas relief be granted.13 7
The federal courts' current preoccupation with procedural
serves the State's interest in preserving the integrity of its rules and
proceedings. The interest in finality, standing alone, cannot provide a
sufficient reason for a federal habeas court to compromise its protec-
tion of constitutional rights.
Id. at 2577.
132. See Max Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection of Societal Change, 44
OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 363-65 (1983).
133. See 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 543.
135. Id Justice Stevens cited Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967)
(harmless error), as an example.
136. 455 U.S. at 543. As an example of this type of case, Justice Stevens
cited Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (Fourth Amendment claim).
137. 455 U.S. at 544. As Justice Stevens observed:
This category cannot be defined precisely; concepts of "fundamental
fairness" are not frozen in time. But the kind of error that falls in
this category is best illustrated by recalling the classic grounds for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus-that the proceeding was domi-
nated by mob violence; that the prosecutor knowingly made use of
perjured testimony; or that the conviction was based on a confession
extorted from the defendant by brutal methods. Errors of this kind
justify collateral relief no matter how long a judgment may have been
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review no more exalts the integrity of the state finality rule
than does the denial of relief in the vast majority of cases re-
viewed on the merits.1 38 The fundamental difference between
the two approaches is that under stringent procedural rules a
prisoner may be denied justice because of the oversight or inad-
vertence of appointed counsel.139 Although procedural rules
may appear to promote principles of federalism, this goal
should be balanced against the rights of litigants as well as the
excessive delay and inefficient use of federal judicial resources
that they cause. When these same principles of federalism can
be protected through an expedited review of the merits, the
federal judiciary's obsession with artificial procedural obstacles
to exalt state comity is too costly.
D. THE "NEW RULE" DOCTRINE OF TEAGUE V. LANE
No commentary on habeas corpus is complete without dis-
cussion of the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Teague v.
Lane.140 The Court, in a plurality opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, adopted Justice Harlan's view1 4 ' that new rules may
be applied retroactively to cases on direct review but not to
cases on collateral attack.'4 Justice Harlan created two excep-
tions to this principle. He said a new rule should be applied
retroactively if it places "certain kinds of primary, private indi-
final and even though they may not have been preserved properly in
the original trial.
The doctrine of non-retroactivity, the emerging "cause and
prejudice" doctrine, and today's "total exhaustion" rule are examples
of judicial lawmaking that might well have been avoided by confining
the availability of habeas corpus relief to cases that truly involve fun-
damental unfairness.
Id. at 544, 547 (footnotes omitted).
138. As noted below, only a very small percentage of habeas cases are
found to be meritorious. This was true even before the Supreme Court began
erecting procedural hurdles to substantive consideration of petitions for
habeas corpus. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2567-68 (1991) (deny-
ing habeas review because counsel filed late appeal).
140. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
141. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-84 (1971) (opinion of
Harlan, J.).
142. 489 U.S. at 305-10. The traditional test of retroactivity was set forth in
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), which required consideration of (1) the
purpose of the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the
effect on the administration of justice. Id. at 297. In a series of cases starting
with United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), and Shea v. Louisiana, 470
U.S. 51 (1985), the Stovall rule was modified by extending the doctrine of ret-
roactivity in criminal cases to all cases then pending on direct review.
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vidual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe"1 43 or if retroactivity requires observance
of "those procedures that... are 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty."'144 The Teague plurality seemed to limit the
second exception to those cases that are substantially related to
guilt or innocence.145
The interest of state finality again spurred the change in
habeas procedures. 146 In defining a "new rule" as one in which
"the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final,"' 47 the Teague Court
created a controversial debate. As Justice Brennan said in dis-
sent, "[flew decisions on appeal or collateral review are 'dic-
tated' by what came before. Most such cases involve a question
of law that is at least debatable."'148 Because of this, Teague
greatly restricts habeas corpus.149
143. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692.
144. Id. at 693 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
145. See 489 U.S. at 311-13. In Teague, the Court faced the question of
whether the fair cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment applies to
the selection of petit juries. Id. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The plurality
indicated that, if adopted, this new rule would not fall within the exceptions
outlined above. Id. at 301, 316.
146. Justice O'Connor reasoned:
Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a con-
viction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality
which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.
Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent
effect. The fact that life and liberty are at stake in criminal prosecu-
tions "shows only that 'conventional notions of finality' should not
have as much place in criminal as in civil litigation, not that they
should have none."
The "costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of
new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus ... generally far out-
weigh the benefits of this application." In many ways the application
of new rules to cases on collateral review may be more intrusive than
the enjoining of criminal prosecutions, for it continually forces the
States to marshall resources in order to keep in prison defendants
whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional
standards. Furthermore, as we recognized in Engle v. Isaac, "[s]tate
courts are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply ex-
isting constitutional law only to have a federal court discover, during
a [habeas] proceeding, new constitutional commands."
Id. at 309-10 (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 301. The Court also defined a new rule as one that "breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government."
Id.
148. Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. Justice Brennan shared this concern, stating that "[t]he plurality's ap-
proach . . .can thus be expected to contract substantially the Great Writ's
sweep." Id. at 334. Justice Brennan wrote:
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There are many criticisms of Teague. 50 For one, the new
principles of retroactivity have spawned a debate over whether
a contention is a "new rule," once again requiring excessive ex-
amination and inefficiency in federal habeas procedures.151 In
addition, Teague undermines the historical development of the
writ of habeas corpus, which, by its very nature, assumes dis-
ruption of conventional notions of finality.152 Perhaps Justice
Brennan best summed up the pernicious effect of Teague in the
final sentence of his dissent, when he stated that "the plurality
would deprive us of the manifold advantages of deciding impor-
tant constitutional questions when they come to us first or most
cleanly on collateral review.' '153
When Congress debated proposed habeas corpus reforms in
1990, it invited several of the chief judges of the courts of ap-
peals to address the proposed amendments.'5 Chief Judge
James L. Oakes of the Second Circuit and Chief Judge Gilbert
S. Merritt of the Sixth Circuit appeared with the author before
a House hearing chaired by then-Congressman Kastenmeier of
Certainly it is desirable, in the interest of fairness, to accord the same
treatment to all habeas petitioners with the same claims. Given a
choice between deciding an issue on direct or collateral review that
might result in a new rule of law that would not warrant retroactive
application to persons on collateral review other than the petitioner
who brought the claim, we should ordinarily grant certiorari and de-
cide the question on direct review.
Id. at 338.
150. See, e.g., David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Ret-
roactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23 (1991);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991); Barry Friedman,
Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797 (1992).
151. Determining what is a new rule is perplexing under the facts of each
case. The division of the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), dem-
onstrates the ambiguity of the new rule. In applying Teague standards to a
collateral attack on capital sentencing procedures, Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, held that the claim did not involve a new rule. Id. at 318-19.
Justice Scalia took the opposite tack, arguing a new rule includes "not only a
new rule that replaces an old one, but a new rule that replaces palpable uncer-
tainty as to what the rule might be." Id. at 352.
152. Justice Brennan observed in Fay v. Noia that in federal habeas corpus,
"conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to
defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal
liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal
judicial review." 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963).
153. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 345 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. See Habeas Corpus Legislation: Hearings on H. 4737, H.R 1090, H.R.
1953, and H.. 3584 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and
the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 120 (1990) [hereinafter House Habeas Hearings].
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Wisconsin.15 5 All three of us were vocal in our criticism of
Teague. Chief Judge Merritt expressed our concerns best of all
by reminding the panel that when Congress passed the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, "the theory was [then,]... as I think it is today,
that the Bill of Rights establishes the rights. Habeas estab-
lishes the remedy. When you weaken the remedy, it leaves the
rights unenforced.' 56 Chief Judge Merritt stated that Teague
represents "the greatest threat in recent years to the remedy
which enforces the right."'1 57 He said Teague
has the effect essentially of freezing the Bill of Rights in habeas cases
in its present form, and not allowing the Supreme Court or the Fed-
eral courts to review any suggested modification... either to constrict
or to expand it . . . Not only is it a radically new rule because it
changes the law of retroactivity; it prevents the common law process
[of incremental adjustment in the law] .... [The worst thing about
this case, of all the bad things about it .... is that it undermines the
common law method of adjudication of cases.1 58
E. A FINAL WORD ON COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Justice Powell's cost-benefit analysis in his concurring
opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte5 9 laid the groundwork
for the Court's retrenchment in federal habeas corpus.160 As
discussed earlier, Justice Powell articulated concerns for feder-
alism that continue to form the foundation for restricting
habeas.' 61 With all due respect, the experience of the last
twenty years has demonstrated principles of federalism do not
merit blanket rules causing federal courts to ignore substantive
complaints of arbitrary and illegal conduct in criminal
prosecutions.
First, habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners make up
only five percent of the civil caseload in federal district court. 62
155. Id.
156. Id. at 159 (statement of Judge Merritt).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 160.
159. 412 U.S. 218, 259-66 (1973).
160. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79-80 (1977); Stone v. Pow-
ell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976). These concerns in large part emanated from
Justice Harlan's dissenting views in Fay v. Noia. They were originally
promulgated by the late Professor Paul Bator in Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REV. 441 (1963).
Professor Bator later served as Deputy Solicitor General during the Reagan
Administration.
161. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 259.
162. State prisoners filed 10,325 habeas corpus petitions in federal court,
which amounted to five percent of all civil actions filed in federal court during
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Their impact is minimal compared to that of diversity of citi-
zenship cases,163 which require federal courts to decide ques-
tions of state law, and to that of federal civil rights litigation
under section 1983.16
Second, the persistent emphasis on finality seems paradoxi-
cal in light of the Court's use of cost-benefit analyses for habeas
corpus. 165 If large numbers of state convictions were being
overturned by lower federal courts, then the concern of state fi-
nality could be of greater significance. However, this has not
occurred.166 Further, while state finality was crucial to the
the year ending June 30, 1991 (total of 207,742). 1991 DIRECTOR OF THE ADmN.
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTS ANN. REP. 190-91.
163. Diversity of citizenship cases totalled 50,944, 24.5% of the total number
of civil cases filed during the year ending June 30, 1991. Id. at 190.
164. Prisoners filed a total of 26,045 § 1983 claims, comprising 12.5% of the
total number of civil cases filed during the year ending June 30, 1991. Id. at
190-91.
165. Although the interest in finality is important to the judicial process,
on balance it pales when compared to the importance of fair and accurate ad-
judication in a case involving a lengthy imprisonment or death. See Coleman
v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1989) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring).
166. The percentage of successful state habeas corpus petitions is very low.
A study for the Department of Justice found that only 3.2% of habeas peti-
tions resulted in any form of relief. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE
JUDGMENTS 34-35 (1988) (citing Paul H. Robinson, An Empirical Study of Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Judgments 4(c), 51 (Federal Re-
search Justice Program 1979)). Similarly, a study of habeas petitions filed in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found
a success rate of three percent from 1973 to 1975, and four percent from 1979
to 1981. Richard Faust et al., The Great Writ in Action: Empirical Light on
the Federal Habeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 637, 668,
677-81 (1991). Interestingly, the success rate increased slightly between the
two periods studied (1973-1975 and 1979-1981) even though the Supreme Court
erected various procedural barriers to the writ in that time. Id. at 681. Other
researchers have estimated the success rate of non-capital habeas petitions to
be as low as 0.25%. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1989) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (citing Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction
Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 513, 520-21 (1988)). Other
figures suggest a seven percent success rate in non-capital habeas petitions. Id.
In stark contrast to these low figures is the high success rate in capital
habeas corpus petitions, where the percentage of successful petitions ranges
from 50% to 70%. See Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Urges Curb on Appeals of
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMEs, May 16, 1990, at Al ("In recent years, more than
half of all state court death sentences have been overturned by Federal courts
during habeas corpus proceedings."); see also Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 24 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (noting a 60% to 70% success rate in capital cases); Bare-
foot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 915 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (indicating
that 70% of capital defendants seeking habeas corpus in federal courts of ap-
peals obtained relief); Mello, supra, at 521 (success rate ranging from 60% to
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question of whether federal courts should offer a forum for
state prisoners to collaterally attack their convictions, Congress
answered that question in 1867 when it directed the federal
courts to provide a habeas forum.16 7
Federal habeas corpus, by its very nature, challenges the fi-
nality of unconstitutional state court convictions. 168 It inevita-
bly provides "duplication of judicial effort," "delay in setting
the criminal proceeding at rest," "inconvenience," and "post-
poned litigation of fact."'1 9 Notwithstanding these obvious con-
cerns, Congress nevertheless created the remedy. Placing
artificial procedural rules on prisoner claims does not eliminate
these concerns. The court-made rules serve only to accentuate
the delay and to increase the inefficient use of the limited re-
sources of the federal courts.
Finality is equally served by federal review of the merits.
This is borne out by the federal statistics showing that federal
courts reject the great majority of state prisoner claims.'7 0 The
fact that federal courts seldom grant writs, however, does not
defeat the need for federal review. The sanctity of life and lib-
75% as of 1982, 70% as of 1983, and 60% as of 1986). The high rate of success of
capital habeas appeals suggests that state courts are overlooking fundamental
constitutional protections in reviewing convictions under their state's laws.
See Coleman, 874 F.2d at 1295 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Judge Reinhardt
postulated that federal courts stand in a better position to adjudicate constitu-
tional rights because of "greater receptivity ... to Supreme Court dictates, in-
sulation from majoritarian pressures, and even superior technical
competence." Id. at 1295 n.8 (citing Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977)).
167. See Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1988)).
168. The decisions of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443 (1953); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (per curiam); and
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), have been the basis for constitutionaliz-
ing state criminal procedure. Decisions such as Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) (per curiam); Stovall v. Denno, 338 U.S. 293 (1967); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), have provided the impetus for the state courts
to "toe the constitutional mark." See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
687 (1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (citing Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S.
217, 226 (1969)). Through such decisions the Court has not emphasized the de-
terrence of finality because it observed a need to protect against the wrongful
deprivation of a person's life or liberty. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 253
(Douglas, J., concurring); Wade, 388 U.S. at 238; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 482.
169. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 261 (1973) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (quoting Anthony Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A
Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 383-84 (1964)).
170. See supra note 166.
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erty is worthy of a backup system to check human fallibility.171
The rule of finality as expressed by Justice Powell is based on
the presumption that "if a job can be well done once, it should
not be done twice."'172 But, what if the job is not done well the
first time?173 All judges are mere humans; no judge is so infal-
lible that he or she should resent hindsight review when an-
other's life or liberty is at stake. 7 4
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, Justice Powell also sought a
"minimization of friction between our federal and state systems
of justice."'1 75 This factor has long been a concern of federal-
ism. 176 Federal concerns cannot be ignored, however, when
Congress sets forth a mandate in which federal adjudication
overlaps state interests. 177 I respectfully suggest that the po-
tential for a federal court to "embarrass" a state court by de-
claring that it had erred in its view of a federal constitutional
right is a shallow reason for denying enforcement of federal
rights.178 It is human nature to want to be right. A trial judge
171. One recent study, relied on by Justice Blackmun, found that 23 inno-
cent people had been executed in the United States during the twentieth cen-
tury. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 876 n.1 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
172. See Bator, supra note 160, at 451.
173. See, e.g., Rust v. Hopkins, 984 F.2d 1486 (8th Cir. 1993). In Rust, the
death penalty sentencing panel failed to use the reasonable doubt standard in
sentencing defendant to death. See i&i at 1493.
174. Concerns of finality should not be paramount when "errors... are so
fundamental that they infect the validity of the underlying judgment itself, or
the integrity of the process by which that judgment was obtained." Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
176. In Younger v. Harris, Justice Black urged that interests of federalism
are necessarily involved in protecting federal rights but courts should vindi-
cate federal rights "in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States." 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Further, Justice Powell also
noted a separate need to maintain a constitutional balance between the inter-
ests of the state and federal systems. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 263 (Powell,
J., concurring).
177. Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is a prime example of the
exercise of federal adjudication involving state interests. See Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1958). Similarly, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, federalism is served by allowing a plaintiff the choice of a state
or federal forum. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 506-07 (1982);
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980). In federal habeas corpus
cases, the Supreme Court recognized in Ex parte Royall that principles of fed-
eralism required exhaustion of state remedies. 117 U.S. 241, 250-52 (1886).
Thus, a state court must be given every opportunity to provide a full and fair
review of any constitutional claim before the claim may be raised in a federal
court.
178. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 263-64 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting
1046 [Vol. 77:1015
HABEAS CORPUS
understandably may be disappointed if reversed by another
court. However, all judges understand the judicial system and
the process of judicial review. Correcting an unconstitutional
legal process that results in the loss of an individual's life or lib-
erty is more important than the personal feelings or sensitivi-
ties of individual judges.
Balancing the interests of federalism in habeas corpus re-
quires federal deference to the interests of the state, but princi-
ples of federalism must yield to the Supremacy Clause.179
Statements of finality should not be judicially exalted to over-
rule the congressional mandate that provides state prisoners a
federal forum. s0 Congress desired an extra check on criminal
convictions because of the fallibility of criminal processes. Fed-
eral judges have the experience and capacity to adjudicate fed-
eral constitutional claims without excessive examination of
procedural barriers. Federal judges can readily recognize frivo-
lous claims. Our present system breeds delay and inefficiency.
Most important, it serves to subordinate federal constitutional
rights to compliance with procedural rules.' 8 ' It is time to sim-
plify federal habeas procedures.
It is indeed a sick society that executes its youth, ill, men-
tally retarded, and paraplegic prisoners without considering
their constitutional claims, simply because their lawyers failed
to file timely appeals or made other procedural errors. 82
speech by Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Paul C. Reardon on the "hu-
miliation of review from the full bench of the highest State appellate court to
a single United States District Court judge"); see also Snead v. Stringer, 454
U.S. 988, 993-94 (1981) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (denying certiorari) ("It is
scarcely surprising that fewer and fewer capable lawyers can be found to serve
on state benches when they may find their considered decisions overturned by
the ruling of a single federal district judge on grounds as tenuous as these.").
179. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
180. See Royall, 117 U.S. at 253.
181. In his dissent in Coleman v. Thompson, Justice Blackmun eloquently
explained this problem:
[D]isplaying obvious exasperation with the breadth of substantive fed-
eral habeas doctrine and the expansive protection afforded by the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of fundamental fairness in state
criminal proceedings, the Court today continues its crusade to erect
petty procedural barriers in the path of any state prisoner seeking re-
view of his federal constitutional claims.... I believe that the Court
is creating a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjusti-
fiable impediments to the vindication of federal rights ....
111 S. Ct. 2546, 2569 (1991).
182. A congressional committee has observed that procedural barriers may
cause inequities, noting that "of two identically situated defendants, each hav-
ing the same meritorious constitutional claim, one was awarded a new trial
and sentence hearing, and the other was executed because his lawyer failed to
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II. THE POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT
While the Supreme Court was erecting the procedural hur-
dles in federal habeas corpus, Chief Justice William H. Rehn-
quist formed an Ad Hoc Committee On Federal Habeas Corpus
in Capital Cases.18 3 In June 1988, he asked the Committee "to
inquire into 'the necessity and desirability of legislation di-
rected toward avoiding delay and the lack of finality' in capital
cases."18 4 The Chief Justice appointed members of the Com-
mittee from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits because the great-
est number of prisoners subject to capital sentences are from
those circuits. 8 5 Retired Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell
chaired the Committee, and Professor Albert M. Pierson of the
University of Georgia Law School, who had experience repre-
senting defendants in capital cases, served as the reporter.186
The Committee observed that current habeas corpus proce-
dures dispense justice ineffectively. 8 7 In particular, the Com-
mittee noted three problems with the current system. The first
was delay and repetition. Because of the multi-layered state
and federal appeal and collateral review processes, piecemeal
litigation caused years of delay between sentencing and final ju-
dicial resolution. 88 The Committee asserted that the lack of fi-
nality undermined public confidence in the criminal justice
system. It found, for example, that the average length of pro-
ceedings in five of the states within the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits was eight years and two months. 8 9 Further, eighty
raise the claim." H.R. REP. No. 681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 134 n.24 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6539.
183. PowELL COMM. REP., supra note 3, at 1.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1-2. The members of the Committee were Chief Judge Charles
Clark of the Fifth Circuit, Chief Judge Paul Roney of the Eleventh Circuit,
District Judge William Terrell Hodges of Florida, and District Judge Barefoot
Sanders of Texas. Id. at 1.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1. The Committee did not mention the delays that stringent,
new procedural by pass rules cause.
189. Id. at 3. The longest case the Committee studied covered a period of
14 years and six months. Id. Public concern over the delay in executing death
row prisoners cannot be attributed solely to federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Critics frequently point to serial killer Ted Bundy's decade on death row as an
example of the undue delays that habeas corpus causes in executing state pris-
oners. See, e.g., Graham Urges Time Limit on Death Appeals, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1989, § 1, at 18 (quoting Sen. Bob Graham's condemnation of Bundy's case
as a "typical abuse" of habeas corpus). Most of the delay in Bundy's execution,
however, occurred while on direct appeal. Convicted separately in 1979 and
1980 of murders in Florida, Bundy v. Wainwright, 651 F. Supp. 38, 39 (S.D. Fla.
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percent of the time spent collaterally litigating death penalty
cases occurred outside of the state collateral proceedings.19 0
The Committee concluded that the present system of collateral
review frustrated the law of the thirty-seven states that then
had the death penalty.1 9 ' Moreover, the lack of finality in
these cases undermined the public's confidence in the criminal
justice system. 92
1986), rev'd, 808 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 1987); Bundy v. Dugger, 675 F. Supp. 622,
628 (M.D. FIa. 1986), aff'd, 850 F.2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1034 (1989), Bundy's direct appeals were completed in 1986, Bundy v. State, 471
So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert denied, 479 U.S. 894 (1986); Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d
330 (Fla. 1984), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1109 (1986). Bundy's state post-conviction
petition was also denied in 1986, Bundy v. State, 497 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 1986).
Federal habeas corpus proceedings began that same year. See Bundy v. Dug-
ger, 850 F.2d at 1402; Bundy v. Wainwright, 651 F. Supp. at 39. Bundy was exe-
cuted two and one-half years later, on January 24, 1989. Graham Urges Time
Limit on Death Appeals, supra, at 18. Thus, three-fourths of the much criti-
cized 10-year period occurred before Bundy initiated federal habeas corpus
proceedings.
190. POWELL COMM. REP., supra note 3, at 3. The Committee studied cases
from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi and Texas. Id. Many states pro-
vide limited post-conviction review. For example, the State of Ohio provides
that Ohio prisoners may litigate in a post-conviction proceeding only those
claims that could not have been litigated before judgment or on direct appeal.
See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26 n.28 (1982) (citing OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2953.21(A) (1975)). Four of the states studied by the Powell Commis-
sion have similar limitations. In Alabama, Alabama Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 32.2 directs that all claims are precluded if they were not raised at trial or
on appeal. Alabama also has a two-year statute of limitations on any post-con-
viction claim. ALA. R. CRiM. P. 32.2(c). Mississippi has a three-year statute of
limitation, MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5, and applies strict rules of procedural by-
pass, id. § 99-39-21. Florida has a two-year statute of limitation. FLA. R. CRIM.
P. 3.850. Texas applies a strict rule of procedural default. See Ex parte Cris-
pen, 777 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en bane) (contemporaneous
objection rule followed except for novel constitutional claims). However, in
Georgia, the General Assembly broadened the scope of post-conviction review
in 1967 by rejecting a strict procedural default rule in favor of a liberalized
rule of "intentional relinquishment or abandonment." See GA. CODE ANN. 9-
14-42. Effective September 1, 1989, the State set up a new procedure in death
penalty cases. Called the "unified appeal" procedure, it makes certain that de-
fendants have every opportunity to raise all constitutional concerns in a timely
and correct manner. GA. R. UNIFIED A. I-IV. It is readily understandable that
abbreviated state post-conviction proceedings will be quicker than plenary fed-
eral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Furthermore, appointed counsel in federal
habeas corpus proceedings will often be new counsel who must familiarize him
or herself with the file and must make an exhaustive analysis of the entire
state proceeding. Generally the state post-conviction counsel will be the same
as the trial and appellate counsel. Under such circumstances, the state pro-
ceeding will generally take less time.
191. POWELL CoMM. REP., supra note 3, at 3.
192. Id. at 1. In its findings, the Committee pointed out that prisoners
were shunted between the state and federal systems, but did not mention the
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Second, the Committee noted a serious problem in satisfy-
ing the need for qualified counsel to represent inmates in col-
lateral review.193 Capital habeas litigation is difficult and
complicated, and prisoners often fail promptly and properly to
exhaust their state remedies.194 If counsel enters the case
when execution is imminent, the prisoner may have already
waived serious constitutional claims.195 The Committee there-
fore recognized that death-row prisoners need competent coun-
sel in both state and federal collateral review.196
Finally, the Committee stressed the fact that habeas corpus
petitions are often filed at the last minute, when there is an im-
pending execution.197 Courts must expend valuable judicial re-
sources as the prisoner seeks a stay of execution.198 To address
this problem, the Committee recommended that the merits of
capital cases be reviewed carefully and not under time pres-
sure.1 99 Once this thorough review has been done, last minute
litigation should not be permitted.200
To resolve these problems, the Committee proposed a new
statutory scheme for capital cases.201 Under the current sys-
tem, capital litigants have an incentive to delay the judicial pro-
ceedings, whereas prisoners sentenced to a term of years tend
to assert their claims as soon as possible in order to gain re-
lease. Thus, the Committee's proposal was to subject capital
cases "to one complete and fair course of collateral review in
the state and federal system, free from the time pressure of im-
pending execution, and with the assistance of competent coun-
sel for the defendant. '20 2
To accomplish this goal, the Committee drafted proposed
legislation. At their option, states could bring capital litigation
circuitous total exhaustion rule of Rose v. Lundy. Recognizing that res judi-
cata was inapplicable to federal habeas proceedings, the Committee noted the
fact that capital litigants return to federal court with repetitive petitions for
relief. Id. at 2-3. It also observed that under the present system, at least three
petitions for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court are permitted: af-
ter direct review, after state trial proceedings, and after the federal habeas
proceedings. Id. at 3.









202. Id. at 6.
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by prisoners within the statute by providing competent counsel
on state collateral review.20 3 States that did so would benefit
because the proposal contained a six-month statute of limita-
tion period for federal habeas petitions.20 4 The Committee
noted that although the six-month period seemed short, it is
longer than the time provided for appeals in the state and fed-
eral systems, or the period for seeking certiorari review in the
Supreme Court.20 5 Second, the Committee's proposal provided
an automatic stay of execution to last until federal habeas
corpus proceedings are completed, or until the prisoner fails to
file a petition within the limitation period.20 6 Finally, although
the proposed statute generally includes only claims exhausted
in state court, it permits immediate presentation of new claims
in federal court in extraordinary circumstances, a practice dif-
ferent than current law.20 7 If no relief is granted in the coun-
seled state and federal collateral processes, later federal habeas
petitions cannot be the basis of a stay of execution, absent ex-
traordinary circumstances and a colorable showing of factual
innocence. 208
The Committee's proposal was released on August 23, 1989
and was placed on the Judicial Conference agenda for debate
on September 20.209 Although the Committee had earlier in-
vited written comments from various parties and organizations
before formulating its proposals, groups such as the American
Bar Association, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, and the federal judiciary had no opportunity to re-
view and comment on the Committee's specific proposal.21 0
Several members of the Judicial Conference were alarmed that
an important vote on this proposal was to take place without
sufficient opportunity for review, substantive input, and cri-
tique. Because of these concerns, the Judicial Conference voted
203. Id.
204. Id. The filing period began to run on the appointment of counsel for
the prisoner, or refusal of the offer of counsel. The six-month period was
tolled during the pendency of all state court proceedings. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 7.
207. Id. Even though exhaustion is waived, the petitioner still faces the
burden of showing cause and prejudice for failure to raise their claims in the
state court.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1.
210. Habeas Corpus Reform. Hearing on S. 88, S. 1757, and S. 176 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Senate Habeas Hearings] (statement of Hon. Donald P. Lay), reprinted in
19 CAP. U. L. REV. 659, 661 (1990).
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seventeen to seven to defer approval of the Powell Committee
Report and recommendation until March 1990.211 The day af-
ter the Judicial Conference action, the Chief Justice asked Jus-
tice Powell to make a public statement concerning his report.212
The Senate, however, had already set forth a schedule for
consideration of the proposed statute.213 Because of this legisla-
tion, Chief Justice Rehnquist determined it was his duty to for-
ward the Powell Committee Report to the Judiciary
Committees of the House and Senate immediately, notwith-
standing the absence of the Conference recommendation.2 14
Chief Justice Rehnquist transmitted this report on September
22. Although several members of the Judicial Conference be-
lieved that this action had undermined the Conference's vote to
defer,215 I felt the Chief Justice's interpretation of the legisla-
tion was understandable. However, the shortcoming of his ac-
tion was that the transmittal did not include a policy statement
from the Judicial Conference and none could be obtained until
March of 1990.216
The Report triggered immediate hearings before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee.217 Appearing on behalf of the Powell
Committee Report was retired Associate Justice Powell, Chief
Judge Clark, and Chief Judge Roney.218 Chief Judge Holloway
of the Tenth Circuit, Chief Judge Oakes of the Second Circuit,
and I, as Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit, were also sum-
moned to comment. 219
211. See 1989 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS ANN. REP. 84; Linda Greenhouse, Judges Challenge Rehnquist Role on
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1989, at Al.
212. In his statement, Justice Powell reiterated his support for the Com-
mittee's proposal. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Statement to the Public (Sept. 21,
1989).
213. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7323, 102 Stat.
4181, 4467. The Act set forth a timetable for Senate action once Chief Justice
Rehnquist forwarded the Powell Committee Report to the House and Senate.
Id. It did not mention approval from the Judicial Conference, but urged expe-
dited filing of the report. Id. at 4467-68. The House had not agreed to a spe-
cific expedited schedule. H.R. REP. No. 681, supra note 182, at 113 n.8.
214. Greenhouse, supra note 211.
215. See id.
216. When I appeared before the Committee in November of 1989, Chair-
man Biden said he "would have felt much more comfortable" had the report
been submitted after Judicial Conference action. See Senate Habeas Hearings,
supra note 210, at 119.
217. See id. at 1.
218. See id. at 5, 234, 252.
219. See id. at 77, 118, 207. Chief Judge Oakes was unable to attend but
sent a written statement. Id. at 77. Testifying in his place was Judge Steven
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The two main legislative proposals submitted at that time
were Senate Bill 1760, which in effect codified the Powell Com-
mittee proposal,220 and Senate Bill 1757, known as the Biden
bill.22 1 Chief Judge Oakes, Chief Judge Holloway, Judge Rein-
hart, and I testified against Senate Bill 1760 and the Powell
Committee Report, and instead advocated adopting the Biden
bill.
The Senate deferred further action on the Powell Commit-
tee Report until the Judicial Conference had an opportunity to
pass upon the proposal. The American Bar Association and
other groups therefore had an opportunity to comment. In
September 1989, the Powell Committee Report was submitted
to the Judicial Conference.222 A group of chief judges-Patricia
Wald of the D.C. Circuit, James Oakes of the Second Circuit,
Leon Higginbotham of the Third Circuit, Sam Irwin of the
Fourth Circuit, Alfred Goodwin of the Ninth Circuit, William
Holloway of the Tenth Circuit, and I, and District Judge Frank
Kaufman-who was a member at-large of the Conference-en-
dorsed a resolution to modify the Powell Committee Report.223
Reinhart of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 212. For the text of my
remarks before the committee, see Senate Habeas Hearings, supra note 210, at
18 (statement of Hon. Donald P. Lay). The lecture from which this article is
adapted drew heavily from these remarks.
220. S. 1760, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); see
also House Habeas Hearings, supra note 154, at 44 (statement of Hon. Lewis F.
Powell).
221. S. 1757, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (statement of Sen. Biden).
222. See 1990 DIRECTOR OF THE ADmIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
CoURTs ANN. REP. 7-8.
223. See House Habeas Hearings, supra note 154, at 158. Our resolution
was as follows:
The Judicial Conference of the United States endorses the essen-
tial objectives of the Powell Committee Ad Hoe Report on federal
habeas corpus review of capital cases:
(1) to eliminate piecemeal appeals;
(2) to provide an automatic stay in capital cases in order to
obviate successive petitions for stay; and
(3) to provide competent counsel on state post-conviction
cases.
The Judicial Conference endorses the recommendations of the
Powell Committee Report with the following modifications:
A. Because many of the delays in habeas corpus procedures are
related to the fact that the defendant was not represented by
competent counsel at the trial level (as well as in the state post-
conviction proceedings), specific mandatory standards similar to
those set forth in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 should be re-
quired with respect to the appointment and compensation of
counsel for capital defendants at all stages of the state and federal
capital punishment litigation.
Upon the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
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We first suggested extending the limitation period the
federal court the court should first determine whether the spe-
cific guidelines for competent counsel were followed in the state
proceedings. If the court determines that competent counsel was
appointed in the state proceedings, the same counsel should be
appointed in the federal court, wherever possible. If the court de-
termines that competent counsel was not appointed in the state
proceedings, the federal district court should appoint new counsel
under the governing guidelines. In the latter case, the federal
court should not require dismissal of non-exhausted state claims,
or apply any procedural default rules or the rule governing the
presumption of correctness of state court findings of fact, regard-
ing those proceedings at which competent counsel was not
present.
COMMENTARY
The present proposal of the Powell Committee provides
states with the option to set standards of competency for the ap-
pointment of counsel in state post-conviction cases. This proposal
has serious drawbacks. Providing states the option to set and
comply with the standards will lead to the creation of different
and inconsistent standards among the states, and will result in
two sets of procedures in federal post-conviction cases: one for pe-
titioners from states that have opted to adopt standards and an-
other for petitioners from states that have not. The result would
be confusion and a proliferation of litigation. Hence, we endorse
the ABA Task Force recommendation of one mandatory national
standard governing competent counsel.
B. The Conference endorses the following recommendation
of the ABA Task Force, except for the language substituted at
the conclusion of this paragraph for the phase "result in a miscar-
riage of justice."
Federal courts should not rely on state procedural bar rules
to preclude consideration of the merits of a claim if the pris-
oner shows that the failure to raise the claim in a state court
was due to the ignorance of the prisoner, or the neglect or ig-
norance of counsel, or if the failure to consider such a claim
would undermine the court's confidence in the jury's deter-
mination of guilt on the offense or offenses for which the
death penalty was imposed, or in the appropriateness of the
sentence of death.
C. The Conference supports the essential features of the
ABA Task Force recommendation concerning second or succes-
sive petitions for habeas relief. The Conference, however, favors
a change in that recommendation so that it be clear that the Con-
ference supports a federal court entertaining a second or succes-
sive petition on the grounds stated in the ABA Task Force
recommendation, but, in addition, stating that any statutory revi-
sion would include a proviso that such a successive or second peti-
tion be entertained where the facts, if proven, would also
undermine the court's confidence in "the appropriateness of the
sentence of death." In order to make this clear within the con-
text of the ABA Task Force recommendation, the Conference
supports the following modified recommendation:
A federal court should entertain a second or successive peti-
tion for habeas corpus relief if: the request for relief is based
on a claim not previously presented by the prisoner in the
state and federal courts and the failure to raise the claim is
1054 Vol. 77:1015
HABEAS CORPUS
Powell Committee proposed.22 We felt that six months was
too short for new counsel to absorb all of the state court pro-
ceedings, including any post-conviction review, and to develop
sufficient understanding of the complexities of death penalty
litigation law.225 As we pointed out, the number of Supreme
Court opinions on cause and prejudice, exhaustion, retroactiv-
ity, abusive petitions, and successive petitions was multiplying.
We thought that at least one year from the conclusion of state
collateral proceedings is required to make an intelligent study
of all of this information and to allege exhausted constitutional
claims.
Another problem with the Powell proposal was that the
time for filing a federal habeas petition began to run as soon as
appointment of counsel was made in the state court.226 In prac-
tice, state courts often appoint new counsel to file state post-
conviction petitions, and they postpone the filing deadline while
the new attorney studies the briefs and records of both the trial
and the direct appeal. Thus, since the limitation period would
not be tolled until the post-conviction petition was actually
filed in the state court, the time limit for filing in the federal
the result of state action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States, the result of Supreme Court recog-
nition of a new federal right that is retroactively applicable,
or based on a factual predicate that could not have been dis-
covered through the exercise of reasonable diligence; or the
facts underlying the claim would be sufficient, if proven, to
undermine the court's confidence in the jury's determination
of guilt on the offense or offenses for which the death pen-
alty was imposed, or in the appropriateness of the sentence of
death.
D. The federal statute of limitations, which should be one
year, should commence upon the conclusion of all direct state ap-
peals and state post-conviction proceedings, and after the date of
judgment on petitions for certiorari timely filed after the final
state court decision on post-conviction relief.
E. The Judicial Conference adopts the following recommen-
dation of the ABA Task Force:
The standard for determining whether changes in federal
constitutional law should apply retroactively should be
whether failure to apply the new law would undermine the
court's confidence in the jury's determination of guilt on the
offense or offenses for which the death penalty was imposed,
or in the appropriateness of the sentence of death.
Id. at 155-58.
224. Id. at 158.
225. For a critical analysis of the six-month limitation, see Michael Mello
& Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionality of the Proposed
Six-Month Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by State
Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 451 (1990).
226. See PowELL CoMM. REP., supra note 3, at 6.
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district court could actually be far shorter than the prescribed
six months.
Justice Powell was concerned that the one-year limitation
we suggested was too long.2 -7 Before the Senate Committee, he
compared the limitations period to those of appeals in other ar-
eas of the law.228 This comparison, however, is unfair. Habeas
corpus petitions are unique because all possible constitutional
claims must be exhausted for fear of bypassing any claim.229
Few lawyers are competent to handle habeas petitions in capi-
tal cases without a great deal of time and study.230 In compari-
son, the attorney for a petitioner in certiorari usually served as
trial and appellate counsel and has focused on the specific areas
for review. Such counsel has lived with the case for years and
understands what issues are involved. A new federal habeas
counsel does not enjoy this same empirical background. The
Powell Committee's rejoinder that the same counsel serves in
both the state collateral and federal habeas petitions23' is an
unrealistic appraisal. Federal habeas counsel is most often not
the same counsel who appeared in the state post-conviction pro-
ceeding.232 Rather, federal habeas counsel is most often ap-
pointed by the federal district court and needs additional time
to examine the entire state court trial transcript as well as the
state post-conviction proceeding.233
The Judicial Conference vote on modifying the six-month
period of limitations was a tie-thirteen to thirteen. In a most
unusual move, the Chief Justice exercised his right to vote, ad-
ding his voice in support of the original Powell Committee pro-
posal.234 Therefore, the opposition Committee's modification
proposal was defeated. 23 5
227. See AD Hoc COMM. ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS iN CAPrrAL CASES,
101ST CONG., 1ST SESS., SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENT ON THE POWELL COMMITrEE
REPORT 4 (1990) [hereinafter POWELL SuPP. COMMENT].
228. Senate Habeas Hearings, supra note 210, at 34.
229. See, e.g., Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
230. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 63-75.
231. POWELL SUPP. COMMENT, supra note 227, at 5.
232. The state public defender's office often represents the indigent de-
fendant in state collateral proceedings; but in many states, because of a heavy
caseload, state public offenders are not allowed to participate in federal habeas
proceedings. These cases simply take too much time.
233. New federal habeas counsel must spend an average of 25% of a year's
billable hours to process a capital case in federal habeas corpus. ABA TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 72 n.96.
234. See Linda Greenhouse, Vote is a Rebuff for Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1990, at A16.
235. Id. Our opposition did not go unheeded in the Senate or the House.
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Chief Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. of the Third Cir-
cuit then proposed the opposition Committee's second modifica-
tion.236 It required states to provide indigent defendants with
experienced criminal attorneys at both the trial and direct ap-
peal as well as the post-conviction proceeding.23 7 Judge Higgin-
botham stressed that "[i]t is at the trial and direct appeal
stage-not in state collateral proceedings-where ineffectual
counsel do the most damage to their clients' rights and to the
In both Senator Biden's bill and Congressman Brooks's bill, a one-year limita-
tion period was proposed. Congressman Brooks's bill read:
SEC. 1101. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Habeas Corpus Reform Act of
1991".
SEC. 1102. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Section 2254 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding
at the end the following:
"(g)(1) In the case of an applicant under sentence of death, any
application for habeas corpus relief under this section must be
filed in the appropriate district court not later than one year af-
ter-
(A) the date of denial of a writ of certiorari, if a petition for
a writ of certiorari to the highest court of the State on direct ap-
peal or unitary review of the conviction and sentence is filed,
within the time limits established by law, in the Supreme Court;
(B) the date of issuance of the mandate of the highest court
of the State on direct appeal or unitary review of the conviction
and sentence, if a petition for a writ of certiorari is not filed,
within the time limits established by law, in the Supreme Court;
or
(C) the date of issuance of the mandate of the Supreme
Court, if on a petition for a writ of certiorari the Supreme Court
grants the writ, and disposes of the case in a manner that leaves
the capital sentence undisturbed.
(2) The time requirements established by this section shall
be tolled-
(A) during any period in which the State has failed to pro-
vide counsel as required in section 2257 of this chapter;
(B) during the period from the date the applicant files an ap-
plication for State post-conviction relief until final disposition of
the application by the State appellate courts, if all filing deadlines
are met; and
(C) during an additional period not to exceed 90 days, if
counsel moves for an extension in the district court that would
have jurisdiction of a habeas corpus application and makes a
showing of good cause."
H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
236. See Higginbotham, supra note 104.
237. Id. at 4. Judge Higginbotham adopted standards set out in the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which requires appointment of counsel in habeas
death penalty cases. Id. The Act recommends appointed counsel be admitted
to practice for at least five years and have at least three years experience try-
ing felony prosecutions. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(5), (6) (1988). In addition, the Act
provides that appointed counsel be given sufficient resources to hire investiga-
tors and experts as needed. Id. § 848(q)(9).
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integrity of the judicial process."238 He cited numerous exam-
ples, including the case of a criminal defense attorney in a capi-
tal case who stated in closing argument that "if he were the
victim's friend, he also 'would want [the defendant] dead.' "239
The Judicial Conference approved this proposal and
amended the Powell Committee Report to incorporate national
mandatory standards for both trial and post-conviction proceed-
ings.240 Our attempt to modify the Powell Committee proposal
was largely motivated by the emphasis placed upon the compe-
238. Higginbotham, supra note 104, at 6. The South Carolina Supreme
Court recently stressed the extraordinary demands required of trial counsel in
capital cases. See Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503 (S.C. 1992). In Bailey, the
court determined that the state's indigent defense fee statutes could not con-
stitutionally be applied in capital cases because "they clearly do not provide
compensation adequate to ensure effective assistance" in death penalty litiga-
tion. Id. at 508. South Carolina law called for appointment of two attorneys in
capital cases; their fees and costs were not to exceed $5,000 per trial. Id. at 505.
Private attorneys were to be paid $15 per hour for in-court time and $10 per
hour for out-of-court time up to the $5,000 cap. Id. The law provided up to
$2,500 for experts and investigation. Id. The two lawyers in Bailey expended
roughly 370 hours and $1,750 obtaining a dismissal of charges against their cli-
ent before trial. Id. An investigator spent 265 hours and about $1,600 investi-
gating the case. Id. Observing the many demands on attorneys at both the
guilt and sentencing phases of death penalty litigation, the court said:
It is an understatement that the very livelihood of many attorneys ap-
pointed to death penalty trials is threatened by this burden, a result
fundamentally unfair to those so impacted. The record before us
demonstrates that capital trials today, as never before, present a myr-
iad of complexities heretofore unknown. For example, until very re-
cent years, most capital trials were, from beginning to end, completed
within four days. Today, selection of the jury alone often consumes a
week or more.
Id.
239. Higginbotham, supra note 104, at 11. Judge Higginbotham said state
and federal reporters "burgeon with cases in which ill-prepared, inexperi-
enced, or grossly negligent lawyers-lawyers whose capabilities might have
been stretched by uncontested divorces or misdemeanor plea bargains-have
been entrusted with the representation of criminal defendants facing the law's
ultimate sanction." Id. at 8-9. He also cited several additional examples re-
ported by an American Bar Association Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas
Corpus. Id. at 9. These include an attorney who referred to his own client as
a "nigger" before the jury, an attorney who stipulated to all the elements of
first degree murder and to two aggravating circumstances supporting the
death penalty, an attorney who was parking his car outside the courthouse
while a critical prosecution witness testified inside, and an attorney who stated
he could identify only two criminal cases by name-Miranda v. Arizona and
Dred Scott v. Sanford. Id. As Judge Higginbotham pointed out, the latter at-
torney "should have quit while he was ahead; Dred Scott was not a criminal
case." Id.
240. See House Habeas Hearings, supra note 154, at 91 (statement of Judge




tency of trial counsel because of the severe consequences of
SEC. 1104. LAW APPLICABLE.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Chapter 153 of title 28, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following: "§ 2256. Law applica-
ble.".
In an action filed under this chapter, the court shall not apply a
new rule. For purposes of this section, the term "new rule" means a
clear break from precedent, announced by the Supreme Court of the
United States, that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the
time the claimant's sentence became final in State court.
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of sections at the be-
ginning of chapter 153 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following: "2256. Law applicable.".
SEC. 1105. COUNSEL IN CAPITAL CASES; STATE COURT.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Chapter 153 of title 28, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following: "§ 2257. Counsel in
capital cases; State court
(a) A state in which capital punishment may be imposed shall
provide legal services to--
(1) indigents charged with offenses for which capital punish-
ment is sought;
(2) indigents who have been sentenced to death and who
seek appellate, collateral, or unitary review in State court; and
(3) indigents who have been sentenced to death and who
seek certiorari review of State court judgments in the United States
Supreme Court.
(b) The state shall establish an appointing authority, which shall
be
(1) a statewide defender organization;
(2) a resource center, or
(3) a committee appointed by the highest State court, com-
prised of members of the bar with substantial experience in, or com-
mitment to, criminal justice.
(c) the appointing authority shall-
(1) publish a roster of attorneys qualified to be appointed in
capital cases, procedures by which attorneys are appointed, and stan-
dards governing qualifications and performance of counsel, which
shall include-
(A) knowledge and understanding of pertinent legal au-
thorities regarding issues in capital cases;
(B) skills in the conduct of negotiations and litigation in
capital cases, the investigation of capital cases and the psychiatric his-
tory and current condition of capital clients, and the preparation and
writing of legal papers in capital cases;
(C) in the case of counsel appointed for the trial or sen-
tencing stages, 5 years of experience in the representation of criminal
clients in felony cases and experience in at least one case in which the
death penalty was sought; and
(D) in the case of counsel appointed for the appellate,
postconviction, or unitary review stages, 5 years of experience in the
representation of criminal clients in felony cases at the appellate,
postconviction, unitary review, or certiorari stages and experience in
at least one case in which the client has been sentenced to death;
(2) monitor the performance of attorneys appointed and de-
lete from the roster any attorney who fails to meet qualification and
performance standards; and
(3) appoint a defense team, which shall include at least 2 at-
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failure to make contemporaneous objections or timely claims in
the initial state proceedings.
We achieved mixed results with our other modifications.
Our proposal to obviate the procedural bypass rules in capital
cases was unfortunately defeated by another closely divided
vote.241 The Committee's proposal to modify the rule in Teague
v. Lane was defeated by a tie vote with the Chief Justice voting
torneys, to represent a client at the relevant stage of proceedings,
promptly upon receiving notice of the need for the appointment from
the relevant State court.
(d) an attorney who is not listed on the roster shall be appointed
only on the request of the client concerned and in circumstances in
which the attorney requested is able to provide the client with quality
legal representation.
(e) No counsel appointed pursuant to this section to represent a
prisoner in State postconviction proceedings shall have previously
represented the prisoner at trial or on direct appeal in the case for
which the appointment is made, unless the prisoner and counsel ex-
pressly request continued representation.
(f) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel appointed pur-
suant to this section during State or Federal postconviction proceed-
ings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under
section 2254 of this title. This limitation shall not preclude the ap-
pointment of different counsel at any phase of State or Federal post-
conviction proceedings.
(g) Upon receipt of notice from the appointing authority that an
individual entitled to the appointment of counsel under this section
has declined to accept such an appointment, the court requesting the
appointment shall conduct, or cause to be conducted, a hearing, at
which the individual and counsel proposed to be appointed under this
section shall be present, to determine the individual's competency to
decline the appointment, and whether the individual has knowingly
and intelligently declined it.
(h) Attorneys appointed from the private bar shall be compen-
sated on an hourly basis and at a reasonable rate in light of the attor-
ney's qualifications and experience and the local market for legal
representation in cases reflecting the complexity and responsibility of
capital cases and shall be reimbursed for expenses reasonably in-
curred in representing the client, including the costs of law clerks,
paralegals, investigators, experts, or other support services.
(i) Support services for staff attorneys of a defender organization
or resource center shall be equal to the services listed in subsection
(h).
(j) If a State fails to provide counsel in a proceeding specified in
subsection (a), or counsel appointed for such a proceeding fails sub-
stantially to meet the qualification standards specified in subsections
(c)(1) or (d), or the performance standards established by the ap-
pointing authority, the court, in an action under this chapter, shall
neither presume findings of fact made in such proceeding to be cor-
rect nor decline to consider a claim on the ground that it was not
raised in such proceeding at the time or in the manner prescribed by
state law."
H.R. 3371, supra note 235.
241. See Greenhouse, supra note 234, at A16.
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to make the tie. 4  The Judicial Conference did approve our
proposal to expand review of successive petitions to allow con-
sideration of the appropriateness of the death sentence.243
In May 1990, the House Judicial Committee held hearings
on the proposed legislation.244 The Kastenmeier bill tracked
the Biden bill.245 During debates on the bill, Judge Paul Roney
and Justice Powell defended the original Powell Committee
Report, particularly disagreeing with our modification on con-
242. Id.
243. See House Habeas Hearings, supra note 154, at 92 (statement of Judge
Roney). Chief Judge William J. Holloway, Jr. summarized our concerns in his
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Senate Habeas Hear-
ings, supra note 210, at 172. He stated:
The Ad Hoc Committee's Report overlooks appalling cases where con-
stitutional claims could only be presented after the conclusion of a
first post-conviction proceeding, with the discovery of concealed evi-
dence withheld from the defendant and his counsel and not earlier
discoverable-evidence which seriously undermined the constitutional
validity of the death sentences involved. If such withheld evidence
undermines the validity of aggravating circumstances considered in
the penalty phase, or makes available a showing of mitigating circum-
stances not able to be considered at that time, clearly a challenge to a
death sentence itself should be heard in a federal habeas case and the
federal court should not be deprived of jurisdiction to consider such
compelling claims.
Id. at 174-75.
244. See House Habeas Hearings, supra note 154, at 1; H.R. REP. No. 681,
supra note 182, at 113-15.
245. See H.R. 4737, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); see also H.R. REP. NO. 681,
supra note 182, at 114. This measure read in Congressman Brooks's bill as
follows:
SEC. 1106. SUCCESSIVE FEDERAL PETITIONS.
Section 2244(b) of title 28, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by inserting (1) after (b);
(2) by inserting ", in the case of an applicant not under sen-
tence of death," after "When"; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
(2) In the case of an applicant under sentence of death, a
claim presented in a second or successive application, that was not
presented in a prior application under this chapter, shall be dismissed
unless-
(A) the applicant shows that-
(i) the basis of the claim could not have been discovered by
the exercise of reasonable diligence before the applicant filed the
prior application; or
(ii) the failure to raise the claim in the prior application was
due to action by State officials in violation of the Constitution of the
United States; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient, if proven,
to undermine the court's confidence in the applicant's guilt of the of-
fense or offenses for which the capital sentence was imposed, or in
the validity of that sentence under Federal law.
H.R. 3371, supra note 235.
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sideration of the appropriateness of the death sentence in a sec-
ond or successive petition.246 Judge Roney indicated to the
Committee that he did not understand the term, "'appropriate-
ness' of the sentence of death," and therefore urged that it
should not be considered in a successive petition.247
Chief Judge Oakes and I pointed out to the Committee
more than thirty-five Supreme Court opinions that discuss the
appropriateness of the death sentence in terms of constitutional
procedures. 248 For example, in Woodson v. North Carolina,249
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, in a combined opinion,
stated as follows:
[Tihe penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of im-
prisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from
life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of
only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determina-
tion that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.250
Thus, this language was not new.251
246. See House Habeas Hearings, supra note 154, at 92-93 (statement of
Judge Roney).
247. Id. at 92.
248. See Senate Habeas Hearings, supra note 210, at 126-51.
249. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
250. Id. at 305.
251. Judge Roney later provided the Committee with a supplemental state-
ment in which he stated that while the appropriateness of the death penalty
was indeed frequently discussed in Supreme Court cases, it had not been used
as a standard of review. House Habeas Hearings, supra note 154, at 95. Judge
Roney's law clerk found in a computer search at least 121 Supreme Court
cases discussing the appropriateness of the death penalty. Id. at 97.
The standard of review, however, is not the issue in controversy. The dis-
cussion at the Judicial Conference did not concern adopting a "standard of re-
view" but it concerned whether the appropriateness of the death sentence
could even be reviewed in addition to the merits of the conviction in a succes-
sive petition. The Powell Commission Report limited a successive petition to
the question of actual innocence. POWELL COMM. REP., supra note 3, at 7.
However, actual innocence is rarely reviewed in capital cases during habeas
corpus proceedings. The overwhelming majority of the cases reviewed by the
Supreme Court concern the appropriateness of the death sentence itself. See,
e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992). The issues generally concern
whether the statute or procedures relating to the death penalty are constitu-
tionally fair. The Powell Commission Report would eliminate consideration of
this issue in a successive petition. Thus, as Judge Holloway made clear, even if
new evidence was discovered, a person who had previously filed a petition for
habeas review could not challenge the illegality of the death sentence itself in
a successive petition upon the basis of newly discovered evidence. See Senate
Habeas Hearings, supra note 210, at 173-74 (statement of Judge Holloway).
The Brooks bill addressed this problem by permitting a successive petition if
"the claim would be sufficient, if proven, to undermine the court's confidence
in the applicant's guilt of the offense or offenses for which the capital sentence
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As of January 1, 1993, the Congress has not yet passed
habeas legislation. 25 The fact that reasonable people may dif-
fer about legislative reform on habeas corpus in capital cases
seems to forestall any definitive legislation. Those of us who
opposed the Powell Committee Report did so primarily because
we felt it did not live up to its billing of fundamental fairness.
We deemed it an attempt to rush many capital cases on a fast
track to execution without needed quality controls on funda-
mental fairness. As this Article explains, much of our concern
lay in the existing case law surrounding habeas corpus. Viewed
with the requirements of procedural bypass, exhaustion, new
rules, successive petitions, and abusive petitions, most of the
measures of the Powell Committee seemed extremely unfair.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult for many of us to believe that in today's soci-
ety an individual may be executed by reason of technical error
by his or her lawyer in order to exalt the goal of state finality
above the requirements of fundamental fairness. When indi-
viduals such as Roger Coleman can be executed simply because
his lawyer filed his notice of appeal three days late,2 53 or be-
cause, as in Carrier,25 4 a lawyer failed to raise a constitutional
claim on the appeal, reasonable doubt exists about the fairness
of our procedures. To many within and without the judiciary,
this seems unconscionable.
The Eighth Circuit wrote in Mercer v. Armontrout:
Human life is our most precious possession. Our natural instincts
guide us from birth to sustain life by protecting ourselves and protect-
ing others. All notions of morality focus on the right to live and all of
man's laws seek to preserve this most important right. When
presented with challenges to a capital sentence, it would be easy to re-
spond rhetorically by asking, "what about the victim whom the de-
fendant has been found guilty of unmercifully killing." But this
approach fails to reflect on the ideal that a government founded by a
moral and civilized society should not act as unmercifully as the de-
fendant is accused of acting. If the original murder cannot be justified
under man's laws, it is equally unlawful and inhumane to commit the
was imposed, or in the validity of that sentence under Federal law." See H.R.
3371, supra note 235, § 1106 (emphasis added).
252. See Statement on Signing the Crime Control Act of 1990, 1990 PUB.
PAPERS 1715-16 (Nov. 29, 1990). President Bush stated in signing the Crime
Control Act of 1990 that habeas "reforms were stripped from the crime bill by
the conference committee" even though both houses of Congress had passed a
version. Id.
253. See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
254. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
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same atrocity in the name of the state. What separates the unlawful
killing by man and the lawful killing by the state are the legal barri-
ers that exist to preserve the individual's constitutional rights and
protect against the unlawful execution of a death sentence. If the law
is not given strict adherence, then we as a society are just as guilty of
a heinous crime as the condemned felon. It should thus be readily ap-
parent that the legal process in a civilized society must not rush to
judgment and thereafter rush to execute a person found guilty of tak-
ing the life of another. 2 55
As we approach the twenty-first century, there is a compel-
ling need to reexamine our procedures to make certain that
inefficient procedural rules do not subsume principles gov-
erning fundamental fairness. This is particularly true as states
continue to use capital punishment in enforcing their criminal
laws. Indeed, one Supreme Court justice has expressed doubt
about the continued constitutionality of the death penalty in
light of the new procedural impediments to review.25 6 As long
as society does not view capital punishment as barbaric or inhu-
mane, a reevaluation of fundamental fairness is needed more
than ever before.
255. 864 F.2d 1429, 1431-33 (8th Cir. 1988).
256. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2525 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun explained:
I also write separately to express my ever-growing skepticism that,
with each new decision from this Court constricting the ability of the
federal courts to remedy constitutional errors, the death penalty re-
ally can be imposed fairly and in accordance with the Eighth Amend-
ment.
• Since Gregg v. Georgia, the Court has upheld the constitution-
ality of the death penalty where sufficient procedural safeguards exist
to ensure that the State's administration of the penalty is neither ar-
bitrary nor capricious. At the time those decisions issued, federal
courts possessed much broader authority than they do today to ad-
dress claims of constitutional error on habeas review, and, therefore
to examine the adequacy of a State's capital scheme and the fairness
and reliability of its decision to impose the death penalty in a particu-
lar case. The more the Court constrains the federal courts' power to
reach the constitutional claims of those sentenced to death, the more
the Court undermines the very legitimacy of capital punishment
itself.
Id. at 2525, 2530 (citations omitted).
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